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Article 4

ERISA's "Bad Boy": Forfeiture For Cause In
Retirement Plans
JOHN W. LEE*
INTRODUCTION

Prior to the enactment of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA),' retirement plans' frequently contained
"bad boy" clauses which denied former plan participants their otherwise nonforfeitable retirement benefits if they were discharged for
cause 3 or if they competed with their former employer after termination of employment.' Although the Internal Revenue Service speci* Partner with the firm of Hirschler, Fleischer, Weinberg, Cox & Allen in Richmond,
Virginia. A.B., University of North Carolina, 1965; LL.B., University of Virginia, 1968;
LL.M., Georgetown University, 1970.
1. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88
Stat. 829 (1974) (codified in scattered sections of 5, 18, 26, 31, 42 U.S.C.). As enacted, ERISA
comprises four titles: Title I (codified in 29 U.S.C. § 1001-1144) contains the sections establishing employee benefit rights administered by the Secretary of Labor; Title II (codified in
scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.) contains amendments to the Internal Revenue Code; Title
III concerns jurisdiction, administration and enforcement; and Title IV creates an insurance
system for plan terminations. Titles I and II contain virtually identical language regarding
plan participation, vesting, and funding. Though different consequences do flow from violations of the two sets of provisions, e.g., ERISA § 502, 29 U.S.C. § 1132 (Supp. V 1975), grants
a private civil cause of action, the primary reason for the extensive overlap in Titles I and II
probably stems from the jurisdictional disputes between the tax and labor committees of both
the House and Senate. See Lee, The "ElaborateInterweaving of Jurisdiction": Labor and Tax
Administration and Enforcement of ERISA and Beyond, 10 RICH. L. REv. 463, 466 (1976)
[hereinafter cited as Lee].
2. The term "retirement plan" will be used herein interchangeably with "employee pension benefit plan," see ERISA § 3 (2), 29 U.S.C. § 1002 (2) (Supp. V 1975), to refer to both
pension plans that provide retirement income, and profit sharing plans that usually provide
a deferral of income. The chief characteristic of a defined benefit pension plan is that the
promise made by the employer concerns the ultimate retirement benefits to be paid the
employees who participate in the plan. See ERISA, § 3 (35), 29 U.S.C. § 1002 (35) (Supp. V
1975); I.R.C. § 414 (j). Under a defined contribution profit sharing plan, on the other hand,
the most constant variable in the pension promise concerns the amount of contributions to
be made to the plan by the employer. See ERISA, § 3 (34), 29 U.S.C. § 1002 (34) (Supp. V.
1975); I.R.C. § 414 (i). In the former the employer bears the risk of investment loss, while in
the latter the investment risk is borne by the participants.
3. The term "participant" is defined as:
any employee or former employee of an employer, or any member or former member
of an employee organization, who is or may become eligible to receive a benefit of
any type from an employee benefit plan which covers employees of such employer
or members of such organization, or whose beneficiaries may be eligible to receive
any such benefit.
ERISA, § 3 (7), 29 U.S.C. § 1002 (7) (Supp. V 1975).
The term "cause" refers to activities such as excessive absenteeism, insubordination or
fighting on the job, which commonly provide the basis for a discharge.
4. See generally text accompanying notes 146 through 178 infra.
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fled certain restrictions on the operation of bad boy clauses,' the
Service did not prohibit them entirely. Furthermore, anticompetitive forfeiture provisions were not prohibited by either the Internal
Revenue Code,' the Welfare and Pension Plan Disclosure Act of
1958, 7 or the federal antitrust laws.8 In the absence of federal regulation before ERISA, state law alone determined the enforceability of
bad boy clauses. On the eve of ERISA, the majority of states upheld
such clauses.'
Under section 514 of ERISA,1° the provisions of Title I of ERISA
5. I.R.C. § 401 establishes the general requirements that a plan must meet to achieve
"qualified" status. Plan qualification results in the following: (1) deferral of taxation for the
participant, see 26 U.S.C. § 402 (1970 & Supp. V 1975); (2) current deductions for the
contributing employer though taxation to the participant is deferred, see 26 U.S.C. § 404
(1970 & Supp. V 1975); and (3) exemption from taxation for the trust forming part of the
plan, see I.R.C. § 501 (a).
Pre-ERISA pronouncements from the Service acknowledged that a qualified plan might
limit or entirely discontinue benefits to an employee discharged for cause. See IRS, U.S.
Treasury Dep't, Publication No. 778, Guides for Qualification: Pension, Profit-Sharing,and
Stock Bonus Plans, pt. 5 (c) (3) (1972). The Service did require that such bad boy clauses
could not discriminate in favor of the prohibited group as defined in .R.C. § 401 (a) (4)(contributions or benefits provided under the plan cannot discriminate in favor of employees who
are officers, shareholders or highly compensated). While the plan would have to distinctly
specify the causes that would result in benefit forfeiture, terms such as misconduct and
dishonesty did not have to be defined. See Rev. Rul. 71-92, 1971-1 C. B. 122.
6. Nolan v. Meyer, 520 F.2d 1276, 1279 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1034 (1975).
7. Lieberman v. Cook, 343 F. Supp. 558 (W.D. Pa. 1972) (construing Pub. L. No. 85-836,
76 Stat. 38 (1948) (codified in 29 U.S.C. § 301-3-9 (1970) which was repealed by ERISA).
8. Golden v. Kentile Floors, Inc., 512 F.2d 838 (5th Cir. 1975); Austin v. House of Vision,
404 F.2d 401 (7th Cir. 1969); Graham v. Hudgins, Thompson, Ball & Assoc., Inc., 319 F. Supp.
1335 (N.D. Okla. 1970).
9. Rochester Corp. v. Rochester, 450 F.2d 118, 122-23 (4th Cir. 1971). See generally
Annot., 18 A.L.R.3d 1246 (1968).
10. Section 514 of ERISA provides:
(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, the provisions of this title
and title IV shall supersede any and all State laws insofar as they may now or
hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan described in section 4 (a) and not
exempt under section 4 (b). This section shall take effect on January 1, 1975.
(b) (1) This section shall not apply with respect to any cause of action which arose,
or any act or omission which occurred, before January 1, 1975.
(2) (A) Except as provided in subparagraph (B), nothing in this title shall be
construed to exempt or relieve any person from any law of any State which regulates
insurance, banking, or securities.
(B) Neither an employee benefit plan described in section 4 (a), which is not
exempt under section 4 (b) (other than a plan established primarily for the purpose
of providing death benefits), nor any trust established under such a plan, shall be
deemed to be an insurance company or other insurer, bank, trust company, or
investment company or to be engaged in the business of insurance or banking for
purposes of any law of any State purporting to regulate insurance companies, insurance contracts,, banks, trust companies, or investment companies.
(3) Nothing in this section shall be construed to prohibit use by the Secretary of
services or facilities of a State agency as permitted under section 506 of this Act.
(4) Subsection (a) shall not apply to any generally applicable criminal law of a
state.
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generally supersede all state laws relating to employee benefit plans,
effective January 1, 1975. However, the ERISA minimum vesting
standards are not effective for a plan in existence on January 1,
1974, until its first plan year" beginning after December 31, 1975.12
Because of this potential twenty-three month delay between ERISA
preemption of state law, 3 and the effective date of the minimum
vesting standards the validity of bad boy provisions during this
interim period is unclear.
A second question concerns the continued effect of bad boy
clauses on otherwise "vested" plan rights that exceed the requirements of ERISA's minimum vesting standards, after those standards become effective. 4 The basic thrust of ERISA mandates compliance with minimum vesting standards for employee pension benefit plans. Under these requirements, a participant's accrued benefit" derived from employer contributions becomes "nonforfeitable"
upon the occurrence of certain events. Usually, the controlling event
will bethe completion of a specified number of years of service, with
(c) For purposes of this section:
(1) The term "State law" includes all laws, decisions, rules, regulations, or other
State action having the effect of law, of any State. A law of the United States
applicable only to the District of Columbia shall be treated as a State law rather
than a law of the United States.
(2) The term "State" includes a State, any political subdivisions thereof, or any
agency or instrumentality of either, which purports to regulate, directly or indirectly, the terms and conditions of employee benefit plans covered by this title.
(d) Nothing in this title shall be construed to alter, amend, modify, invalidate,
impair, or supersede any law of the United States (except as provided in sections
111 and 507 (b)) or any rule or regulation issued under any such law.
29 U.S.C. § 1144 (Supp. V 1975).
11. The terms "plan year" and "fiscal year of the plan" are defined as the "calendar,
policy or fiscal year on which the records of the plan are kept." ERISA, § 3 (39), 29 U.S.C. §
1002 (39) (Supp. V 1975).
12. ERISA, § 211 (b), 29 U.S.C. § 1061 (b) (Supp. V 1975); ERISA § 1017, I.R.C. § 410
(historical note).
13. In the case of a plan year ending November 30, 1976, the first plan year to which the
minimum vesting standards applied was the fiscal year beginning December 1, 1976, 23
months after January 1, 1975.
14. See Temp. Treas. Reg. § 11.411 (a)- 4 (c) (example 1), 40 Fed. Reg. 51,424 (November
5, 1975).
15. "Accrued benefit" is defined in Title I of ERISA as:
(A) in the case of a defined benefit plan, the individual's accrued benefit determined under the plan and . . . expressed in the form of an annual retirement
benefit commencing at normal retirement age, or
(B) in the case of a plan which is an individual account plan [e.g., profit-sharing
plans] the balance of the individual's account.
ERISA, § 3 (23), 29 U.S.C. § 1002 (23) (Supp. V 1975).
16. For purposes of determining a participant's vesting rights,Titles I and II of ERISA
define a "year of service" as: "a calendar year, plan year, or other 12-consecutive-month
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the employer who maintains the plan.'7 Under pre-ERISA tax law,
the term "nonforfeitable" meant, among other things, that a vested
interest would not be forfeited if an employee violated a bad boy
clause.' 8 This result apparently also occurs under the ERISA minimum vesting standards, i.e., violation of a bad boy clause will not
legally cause a forfeiture of a former participant's "nonforfeitable"
accrued benefits. The congressional committee reports on ERISA
repeatedly state, for example, that "a vested benefit is not to be
forfeited because the employee later went to work for a competitor,
or in some other way was considered 'disloyal' to the employer."' 9
However, in this context, "vested" apparently refers to only that
portion of the plan rights that ERISA minimum standards require
to be nonforfeitable. 0 Thus, it remains an open question whether a
bad boy clause could be enforced to effect a forfeiture of plan benefits that exceed the ERISA minimum vested amount.
During the floor debate, the comments of Representative Dent,
period designated by the plan (and not prohibited under regulations prescribed by the Secretary [of Labor]) during which the participant has completed 1,000 hours of service." ERISA,
§ 203 (b)(2) (A), 29 U.S.C. § 1053 (b)(2) (A) (Supp. V 1975); I.R.C. § 411 (5) (A). Special
provisions are made for seasonal and maritime industries and regulations are to be promulgated by the Secretary of Labor defining the term "hour of service." Years of service are
required to be distinguished from "years of participation" which are defined in § 411 (b) (3)
(A) of the Internal Revenue Code:
[fror purposes of determining an employee's accrued benefit . . . [as] a period
of service (beginning at the earliest date on which the employee is a participant in
the plan and which is included in a period of service to be taken into account under
section 410 (a) (5) [minimum participation standards]) as determined under regulations prescribed by the Secretary of Labor which provide for the calculation of
such period on any reasonable and consistent basis.
I.R.C. § 411 (b)(3)(A).
17. ERISA, § 203 (a) (2), 29 U.S.C. § 1053 (a) (2) (Supp. V 1975); ERISA, § 1012 (a)
(2), I.R.C. § 411 (a) (2). Sections 203 (a) (2) and 1012 (a) (2) establish three alternative
minimum vesting standards: (1) 10 year "cliff" vesting; (2) 5 to 15 year "graduated" vesting;
and (3) "rule of 45" vesting. For a discussion of these alternatives see text accompanying
notes 80-96 infra. The number of a participant's years of service are figured into his retirement
plan's vesting schedule to obtain a percentage value. This value is then applied to the
monetary figure which represents the participant's accrued benefits to obtain the monetary
value of his nonforfeitable accrued benefits.
18. See Liberty Mach. Works, Inc., 62 T.C. 621 (1974), aff'd, 518 F.2d 554 (8th Cir. 1975);
Hazel v. Pollnow, 35 T.C. 715 (1961). Title I seems to define the term "nonforfeitable" to
similar effect: "a claim obtained by a participant or his beneficiary to that part of an immediate or deferred benefit under a pension plan which arises from the participant's service, which
is unconditional, and which is legally enforceable against the plan." ERISA, § 3 (19), 29
U.S.C. § 1002 (19) (Supp. V 1975).
19. S. REP. No. 93-383, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 50 (1973)[hereinafter cited as S. REP. No.
93-383]; accord, H.R. REP. No. 93-807, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 60 (1974) [hereinafter cited as
H.R. REP. No. 93-807].
20. The language quoted in the text is merely a more narrow application of the statement
that "no rights, once they are required to be vested, may be lost by the employee under any
circumstances ..
" S. RP. No. 93-383, note 19 supra, at 50.
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Chairman of the General Subcommittee on Labor of the House
Committee on Education and Labor, and a prime supporter of
ERISA, indicate that such excess benefit forfeitures could be a possibility. "Another issue dealt with in the conference report is the
policy against what has been described as 'bad boy' clauses. While
firmly articulating this policy, the conferees expressly provided...
that a plan be permitted to suspend benefits under certain circumstances."'"
This article will address the issues raised by the interplay of
ERISA provisions and bad boy clauses: (1) whether state or federal
common law governs the enforceability of bad boy clauses during
the interim period between section 514 preemption of state law and
the effective date of the minimum vesting standards; and (2)
whether excess benefits can be forfeited, both during and after the
interim period, by operation of a bad boy clause.
Resolution of these questions requires an examination of the legislative history of ERISA, its relevant provisions, and prior state law
concerning forfeiture of accrued benefits. Two recent conflicting
decisions22 that directly address the "gap" issue will be considered
first, in order to present clearly the issues and to suggest answers to
the second question of excess benefit forfeitures.
POSITING THE ISSUE: Amory AND Keller
In Amory v. Boyden Associates, Inc.,23 the plaintiff was employed
by Boyden Associates, Inc., the plan sponsor,24 for sixteen years. In

July, 1975, Amory voluntarily resigned in order to work for another
firm. At that time the vested portion of the benefits allocated to his
account under Boyden's profit-sharing plan amounted to approximately $70,000. However, the plan contained a provision by which
a participant's vested benefits would be forfeited if he went to work
for a competitor within five years of termination with the plan sponsor. In August, 1975, the plan's managing committee 25 determined
21.

120 CONG. REC. 29197 (1974), reprinted in III STAFF ON SUBCOMM. ON LABOR OF THE
94 Cong., 2d Sess., LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE
EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT INCOME SECURITY ACT OF 1974, at 4669 (Comm. Print 1976) thereinafter
SENATE COMM. ON LABOR AND PUBLIC WELFARE,

cited as LEGISLATIVE HISTORY].

22. Amory v. Boyden Associates, Inc., 434 F. Supp. 671 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). Keller v.
Graphic Systems, Inc., 422 F. Supp. 1005 (N.D. Ohio 1976).
23. 434 F. Supp. 671 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
24. A "plan sponsor" is the employer in the case of a plan maintained by a single employer. ERISA, §3(16) (B) (i), 29 U.S.C. § 1002 (16) (B) (i) (Supp. V 1975). If the plan does
not otherwise provide, the plan sponsor is also the "administrator" of the plan. Id. § 3 (16)
(A) (ii).
25. Many pre-ERISA pension plans allocated administrative functions to a committee,
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that Amory was employed by a competitor and accordingly suspended his benefits.
In Keller v. Graphic Systems, Inc.,"6 the plaintiff also voluntarily
terminated his twelve years of employment and immediately went
to work for a competitor. Keller's termination of employment oc27
curred in August, 1973, prior to any of ERISA's effective dates.
However, the employer's qualified profit-sharing plan required a
terminated employee to wait for a period of two years before vested
benefits could be distributed. The plan also established a complete
forfeiture of vested rights if, after termination, a participant entered
into employment with a direct competitor of the plan sponsor.
Keller had four full years of participation in the plan2 at the time
of his termination, and a forty percent vested interest in his account
balance of $11,738. In July, 1974, Keller was informed that the
trustees intended to declare a forfeiture of his vested interest due
to his violation of the plan's noncompetition clause. Thereafter,
upon the expiration of the two year waiting period in August, 1975,
Keller's counsel made a demand upon the plan trustees for payment
of his vested interest.29 The trustees denied Keller's claim.
Thus, in Keller and Amory, the federal district courts 0 considered
the law applicable to "bad boy" clauses during the gap period between the effective date of the ERISA preemption provisions and
the ERISA minimum vesting provisions and reached different results.
commonly designated a retirement or administrative committee. This was particularly true
when the plan had a corporate trustee.
26. 422 F. Supp. 1005 (N.D. Ohio 1976).
27. The earliest ERISA effective date is June 30, 1974, ERISA, § 4082 (b) (2), 29 U.S.C.
§ 1381 (b) (2) (Supp. V 1975) (the "open window" for certain plan terminations with regard
to ERISA termination insurance provisions). For a novel attempt to obtain ERISA jurisdiction on the ground that a cause of action arose at the time of a pre-ERISA termination but
lay dormant until September 2, 1974, the date of ERISA's enactment, see Martin v. Bankers
Trust Co., 417 F. Supp. 923 (W.D. Va. 1976).
28. Under ERISA the nonforfeitability of accrued benefits under all pension plans (except
"class year" plans and plans with immediate vesting) depends in part upon completion of
"years of service," see notes 11 and 15 supra, including, with certain exceptions, years of
service completed prior to entry into the plan. The exceptions include years of service during
which the plan sponsor did not maintain the plan. ERISA, § 203 (b)(1) (c), 29 U.S.C. § 1053
(b) (1) (c) (Supp. V 1975); I.R.C. § 411 (a) (4) (C). However, under pre-ERISA plan design,
vesting frequently depended solely upon years of participation in the plan.
29. Both parties agreed that Keller's cause of action arose on August 31, 1975, when
demand for payment was made following expiration of the two year waiting period. 422 F.
Supp. at 1007.
30. United States district courts and state courts of competent jurisdiction have concurrent jurisdiction over actions to recover benefits due under a plan arising after December 31,
1975. ERISA, §§ 502 (a) (1) (B), (e) (1), 514 (b) (1), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1132 (a) (1) (B), (e) (1),
1144 (b) (1) (Supp. V 1975).
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In Keller, the district court ruled that since the minimum vesting
requirements of ERISA were not yet effective, it "must look to preERISA federal and state law with regard to private profit sharing
and retirement plans ..
."3, Because Keller's claim to a vested
interest arose independently of ERISA, a fortiori it arose under state
law. Accordingly, the district court concluded that under Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins 3 state law governed Keller's claim and held
that an Ohio state court would apply a "reasonableness" test and
uphold the forfeiture. 3 However, the Keller court failed to consider
34
the effect of the ERISA preemption provision.
In contrast, in Amory the District Court for the Southern District
of New York squarely faced the gap issue. That court noted the
absence of an express provision in ERISA dealing with bad boy
forfeitures of vested rights declared during the interim period. According to the Amory court, these forfeitures are outlawed only as
of the effective date of the minimum vesting standards. The court
acknowledged that "plaintiff would have us fill this apparent void
[the gap period] by pre-dating the prohibition of forfeitures, while
defendants would have us rule that insofar as it concerns forfeitures,
[ERISA] is wholly without effect until January of 1976. ' 31 The
court rejected both approaches, instead ruling that during the gap
period the effect and operation of bad boy clauses must be governed
by federal common law derived from ERISA.3 6 Thus, the Amory rule
is that during the interim:
declarations of forfeiture of vested pension rights must be subject
to judicial scrutiny according to a reasonableness test. The standard of reasonableness, should, as a consequence of the public
policy expressed in the Congressional mandate, be a rigorous one
and should be applied both to forfeiture provisions and their application. . . . Indeed, we believe that during this interim period
ERISA creates a presumption of unreasonableness in forfeiture
31. Keller v. Graphic Systems, Inc., 422 F. Supp. 1005, 1009 (N.D. Ohio 1976).
32. 304 U.S. 64 (1938). See notes 129 through 136 and accompanying text infra.
33. Because no Ohio state court had actually ruled on the enforceability of a bad boy
clause in a qualified plan, the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio
was forced to decide the issue as if it were an Ohio state court. In doing so the court adopted
the "majority" state rule, which upholds the "validity of noncompetition forfeiture provisions
in pension plans absent a statute to the contrary ....
422 F. Supp. at 1013.
34. While the court cited ERISA, § 514, 29 U.S.C. § 1144 (a) (Supp. V 1975), it focused
primarily on the effective date of the minimum vesting standards, ERISA, § 211, 29 U.S.C.
§ 1061 (Supp. V 1975). While properly noting that the ERISA vesting standards were not yet
effective, the court concluded that since ERISA was not dispositive of the vesting and forfeiture issue, state law applied. 422 F. Supp. at 1008-09.
.35. Amory v. Boyden Associates, Inc., 434 F. Supp. 671, 672 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
36. Id.
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provisions and places the burden of proof on those who wish to
apply them. 7
According to the Amory court, this conclusion is strengthened by
the fact that the effective date of ERISA's ban on forfeiture provisions in pension plans was delayed until January 1, 1976,38 "not
because of any Congressional hesitancy concerning the wisdom of
the prohibition, but because employers needed more time to insure
that their funds were adequately financed to comply with the statute's vesting requirements of which the anti-forfeiture section is a
part."39
In contrast, the Keller opinion rejected the argument that the
forfeiture was contrary to an emerging public policy opposing forfeitures of vested rights. While ERISA emphasizes nonforfeitable pension benefits and replaces the prior considerations of reasonableness
and business justification, "[iut required comprehensive legislation
• . .to make that new consideration preeminent and such legislation is prospective in operation. . .To invalidate past action on the
basis of present and future policy would be manifestly unfair."'"
Interestingly, in the course of deciding the validity of bad boy
forfeitures during the gap period, both the Amory and Keller courts
assumed that after the effective date of the minimum vesting provisions, a plan participant's vested rights to qualified plan benefits
could not be forfeited by operation of a bad boy clause prohibiting
competitive behavior.
However, neither court considered temporary Treasury regulations, recently finalized, which were already almost a year old at the
time of the opinions." These regulations permit bad boy forfeitures
of rights vested in excess of the ERISA nonforfeitable minimum.42
In addition, the pre-ERISA vesting schedule in Keller easily could
be brought within the parameters of a regulation example that per37. Id. at 673.
38. Id. More accurately, § 203 of ERISA does not become effective for plans in existence
on January 1, 1974, until the first plan year beginning after December 31, 1975. ERISA, §
211 (b) (2), 29 U.S.C. § 1061 (b) (2) (Supp. V 1975); I.R.C. § 410 (historical note).
39. Amory v. Boyden Associates, Inc., 434 F. Supp. 671, 673 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
40. Keller v. Graphic Systems, Inc., 422 F. Supp. 1005, 1014 (N.D. Ohio 1976).
41. See text accompanying notes 101 through 103 infra. Those regulations have been
promulgated in final form and may be found at 42 Fed. Reg. 42,318 (Aug. 23, 1977).
42. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.411 (a) - 4 (a), 40 Fed. Reg. 51,423 (Nov. 5, 1975) ("To the
extent that rights are not required to be nonforfeitable to satisfy the minimum vesting standards, or the nondiscrimination requirements of § 401 (a) (4), they may be forfeited ..
").
The final regulations promulgated in 42 Fed. Reg. 42,326 (Aug. 23, 1977) contain identical
language.
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mits a forfeiture for cause.43 Thus, under the Treasury Department's
reasoning the ERISA minimum vesting requirements apparently
permit a forfeiture on facts such as those in Keller." The Amory
court correctly held that during the interim period between the
effective date of the ERISA preemption provision and the effective
date of the minimum vesting standards, federal common law derived from ERISA and its underlying public policy should govern
bad boy clauses. However, that court erred by interpreting federal
common law to require a reasonableness test of these clauses. An
examination of the legislative history of ERISA's preemption and
vesting provisions, and the public policy underlying them will show
that federal common law should declare unenforceable all bad boy
clauses during the gap period as well as after the effective date of
the minimum vesting standards. Furthermore, the same public policy supports a voiding of bad boy forfeitures as to benefits vested in
excess of the minimum standards.
ERISA's

NONFORFEITABILITY PROVISIONS

Background and History
Before ERISA, over two-thirds of the privately maintained qualified retirement plans provided vested rights to benefits prior to
retirement. But, generally, under the larger plans employees did not
acquire vested rights until they either were relatively mature or had
43. Id. §§ 11.411 (a)-4 (c) (example 1), 40 Fed. Reg. 51,423-24. Treas. Reg. § 1.411 (a)-4
(c) (example 1), 42 Fed. Reg. 42,327 (Aug. 23, 1977). See notes 101 through 102 and accompanying text infra.
44. Under ERISA, a plan's vesting schedule is permitted to disregard years of service
completed prior to the establishment of the plan. ERISA, § 203 (b) (1) (c), 29 U.S.C. § 1053
(b) (1) (c) (Supp. V 1975); I.R.C. § 411 (a) (4) (c). Therefore, the Keller plan's vesting
schedule could be amended to provide 10% vesting for each year of service (disregarding years
of service completed prior to March 1, 1969, the plan's original effective date), subject to
divestiture for cause until completion of 10 years of such service. The plan would then meet
the 10 year "notch" minimum nonforfeitability alternative of § 411 (a) (2) (A) of the Internal
Revenue Code, and § 11. 411 (a)- 4 (c) (example 1) of the temporary and final Treasury
regulations. Also, under Revenue Procedure 76-11, 1976-1 C.B. 550, a plan is deemed to meet
the requirement of § 401 (a) (4) of the Internal Revenue Code, if its vesting schedule meets
one of the ERISA minimum vesting, i.e., nonforfeitability, requirements and, "in the case of
any plan which had previously been the subject of a favorable advance determination letter
which has not been revoked, [if] the percentage of vesting of each participant provided under
the plan, as amended, is not less (at every point) than that provided under the vesting
schedule of the plan upon which such most recent prior determination letter was based ..
"
Id. § 3.01 (2). Under its then most recent determination letter, the Keller plan provided 10%
vesting for each year of participation, subject to divestiture for cause. Thus, the Keller plan
would have met the test in Revenue Procedure 76-11 quoted above if it had been amended to
include a vesting schedule which recognized 10% for each year of service (disregarding years
of service completed prior to the plan's original effective date), subject to divestiture for cause
prior to completion of 10 years of service. See Lee, Credited Service After ERISA, 31 TAx. L.
REv. 365, 465 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Credited Service].
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completed a long period of participation. 5 Specifically, only onethird of the private plan participants had a fifty percent vested right
to accrued retirement benefits. Moreover, fifty-eight percent of the
plan participants between the ages of fifty and sixty, and fifty-four
percent of those age sixty and over were not even fifty percent
vested.46 Consequently, even employees with substantial periods of
service could lose their retirement benefits upon separation from
service. In extreme cases, aged participants lost their entire retirement benefits due to their discharge shortly before reaching retirement age. 7
Representative Dent believed that vesting constituted the worst
situation encountered in the congressional examination of the entire
private pension system. 8 Senator Long, Chairman of the Senate
Committee on Finance, also pointed out:
Now, what kind of equity is there in a situation where you have a
company, which because of normal turnover of personnel, has an
employee who stayed with the company for 30 years and then left,
and the company picks up the pension that he left. Not only that
pension but the pension that perhaps 50 other people earned. What
kind of justice is that?"

Long's and Dent's premise, accepted by commentators, 0 was that
employer contributions constitute deferred wages earned by the par45. S. REP. No. 93-383, supra note 19, at 14; H.R. REP. No. 93-807, supra note 19, at 12.
46. Id.
47. Plan rules governing service-related eligibility requirements, such as a requirement
that 20 years of service be completed, uninterrupted by a "break-in-service" (a 12 month
period during which a participant is credited with less than 500 hours of service, see, e.g.,
ERISA, § 2-3 (b)(3)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 1053 (b)(3)(A) (Supp. V 1975)) have generated considerable litigation. See, e.g., Johnson v. Botica, 537 F.2d 930 (7th Cir. 1976); Foley v. Devaney,
528 F.2d 888 (3d Cir. 1976); Lugo v. Employees Retirement Fund of Ilium. Prods. Indus., 529
F.2d 251 (2d Cir. 1976); Maness v. Williams, 513 F.2d 1264 (8th Cir. 1975); Giler v. Board of
Trustees of Sheet Metal Workers Pension Plan, 509 F.2d 848 (9th Cir. 1975); Pete v. U.M.W.
Welfare and Retirement Fund, 517 F.2d 1267 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
48. Hearings on H.R. 2 and H.R. 462 before the GeneralSubcomm. on Labor of the House
Comm. on Education and Labor, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 499 (1973) [hereinafter cited as H.R.
2 Hearings] ("The real problem is the vesting where men have worked for 40 and more years
for different employers and they never vested anywhere.").
49. Hearings on S. 4, S. 1179, and S. 1631 Before the Subcomm. on PrivatePension Plans
of the Senate Comm. on Finance, 93d Cong., 1st Sess 1, 340 (1973) [hereinafter cited as
Senate Finance Hearings]; see 120 CONG. REc. 4287 (1974), reprinted in II LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 21, at 3395 ("It is immoral to require a worker to forfeit 25 years of pension
contributions and benefits if he exercises his God-given right to take another job . .
(statement of Rep. Biaggi).
50. Note, Pension Plans and the Rights of the Retired Worker, 70 COLUM. L. REv. 909,
917 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Rights of the Retired Worker]; Note, Forfeiture of Pension
Benefits for Violation of Covenants Not to Compete, 61 Nw. L. REv. 290, 292-94 (1966)
[hereinafter cited as Forfeiture of Benefits]. See, e.g., Boyer v. Piper, Jaffray & Hopwood,
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ticipants and not merely employer gratuities. The ERISA committee reports indicate that both houses of Congress agreed forfeitures
of pension benefits upon separation from service were inequitable,
apart from the resulting hardships, "since the pension contributions
previously made on behalf of the employee may have been in lieu
of additional compensation or some other benefit which he would
have received."'" Furthermore, factors such as the mobile nature of
the American economy wherein employees tend to change jobs frequently, and the cyclical nature of certain industries plagued by
frequent layoffs added to the tax committees' belief in the necessity
for vesting standards that insure covered employees will actually
benefit from retirement plans. 52 Insofar as Congress thought that
more rapid vesting would improve the mobility of labor and thereby
promote a more healthy economy,"3 eliminations of bad boy clauses
would be consonant with that goal.
Representative Dent believed that ideally an employee should be
fully vested after only a trial period of service.54 But Congress was
aware that under our voluntary pension system, the cost of financing pension plans is an important factor in determining whether
any particular retirement plan will be adopted, and that unduly
large increases in costs could impede the growth and improvement
of the private retirement system. For this reason, in the case of
those requirements which add to the cost of financing retirement
plans, the committee has sought to adopt provisions which strike
a balance between providing meaningful reform and keeping costs
within reasonable limits. 5

In other words, Congress recognized that a requirement of immediate and full vesting was not feasible since additional costs would
inhibit employer willingness to adopt new plans and to liberalize
existing plans.5 1 Ultimately, the House committees, faced with the
Inc., 391 F. Supp. 471, 473 (D.S.Dak. 1975); Ware v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith,
Inc., 24 Cal. App. 3d 35, 100 Cal. Rptr. 791, 797-98 (1972); Van Hosen v. Bankers Trust Co.,
200 N.W.2d 504 (Iowa 1972).
51. S. REP. No. 93-383, supra note 19, at 45; H.R. REP. No. 93-807, supra note 19, at 53.
52. H.R. REP. No. 93-807, supra note 19, at 18; S. REP. No. 93-383, supra note 19, at 19.
53. S. REP. No. 93-383, supra note 19, at 45. For a thoughtful analysis of the effects of
vesting on employee mobility see Norman, Private Pensions: A Study of Vesting, Funding,
and Integration, 21 FLA. L. REv. 141, 156-59 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Norman]; see also
Koehn & Ptacek, Employer Protection Against Loss of the Key Employee, 57 IowA L. REv.
75 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Koehn & Ptacek].
54. H.R. 2 Hearings, supra note 48, at 285, 499; see also S. REP. No. 93-383, supra note
19, at 19; H.R. REP. No. 93-807, supra note 19, at 19.
55. S. REP. No. 93-383, supra note 19, at 18.
56. Id. at 15-19; H.R. REP. No. 93-807, supra note 19, at 19; H.R. 2 Hearings, supra note
48, at 235, 330, 411, 509; Senate Finance Hearings, supra note 49, at 346-51, 354.
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necessity of providing adequate flexibility for minimum vesting
standards for thousands of retirement plans, concluded that it was
not desirable to force all retirement plans into one rigid vesting
schedule."
The Nixon administration, at the ERISA hearings, articulated
other, perhaps ideological considerations such as the role of government intervention in pension planning. The administration advocated the view that unions and employers in collective bargaining
already had negotiated trade-offs between vesting rights and benefit
levels.5" A related criticism was voiced by Representative Erlenborn,
the ranking minority member of the General Subcommittee on
Labor of the House Committee on Education and Labor. He felt
that organized labor had negotiated for and received high benefit
levels, primarily because of the large numbers of forfeitures resulting from the permissible slow vesting. Having achieved high levels
of benefits, labor now was unfairly "coming to Congress to impose
on plans additional costs for vesting that . . . [labor] had not
' '59
negotiated for.
57. H.R. REP. No. 93-807, supra note 19, at 19; 120 CONG. Rac. 4287, 4292 (1974) (remarks
of Reps. Biaggi and Ullman, respectively), reprinted in H LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note
21, at 3395, 3407.
58. As then Secretary of Treasury Shultz stated during the 1973 hearings before the
Senate Committee on Finance:
People have to make a judgment about the nature of the plan they want to agree
to. I think to a degree we have to say in the government that if the unions and
management want to make an agreement of some kind and it is satisfactory to them
and it is full and open and above board, then we should think twice about putting
ourselves above their judgment in this tradeoff that they have.
Now, in imposing a rule of vesting of some kind-and I have no doubt this is the
reason why Congress has not done it up to this point-you are imposing a governmental judgment on these private plans. And we think that it is appropriate to do
that but not to go so far as to basically destroy the cost basis of the gigantic private
pension plans we have.
Senate Finance Hearings, supra note 49, at 341; see also H.R. 2 Hearings, supra note 48, at
72-73, 388-89 (remarks of Reps. Burton and Erlenborn, respectively).
59. H.R. 2 Hearings, supra note 48, at 421. The same type of thought process is reflected
in a recent Eighth Circuit case which held that federal labor law preempted the Minnesota
Pension Act, MINN. STAT. §§ 181 B.01-17 (1976). White Motor Corp. v. Malone, 545 F.2d 599
(8th Cir. 1976). The state statute required the employer to fund fully his plan's past service
liability, i.e., liability attributable to service completed prior to the plan's establishment,
upon termination of the plan or cessation of operations at a place of employment. MINN. STAT.
§ 181 B.03 (1976). Prior to the enactment of ERISA, past service liability was amortized over
a 40 year period, if credit was given at all for service prior to the plan's establishment. Thus,
the statute was preempted, since it directly intruded upon the employer's substantive obligations under a plan which resulted from negotiations conducted pursuant to the National
Labor Relations Act, as follows:
(1) the [state] Act grants employees vested rights to pension benefits which are
not available under the pension plan; (2) to the extent of any deficiency in the
pension fund, the [state] Act requires satisfaction of pension benefits from the
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The administration's negotiation analysis was, in turn, criticized
by Ralph Nader who alleged that the union negotiators had failed
to adequately represent employee participants due to conflicts of
interest.'" The conflicts of interest were not, however, between union
officials and the employees they represented. In many cases, particularly in the low-wage industries, the primary conflict centered on
the relative priority to be accorded the competing interests of young
workers with up to thirty-five years remaining until retirement, and
old workers nearing retirement age.6 In effect, the thrust of the
pension reform movement concerning vesting schedules favored
congressionally enacted minimum standards which organized labor
perhaps, simply could not achieve through collective bargaining.
Yet, Congress was well aware of the thin line distinguishing viable
minimum standards from those which would impose costs resulting
general assets of the employer, while the pension plan provides that benefits shall
be paid only out of the pension fund; and (3) the [state] Act does not permit
employers to escape liability for funding of pension rights, but the pension plan
permits White Motor to terminate the plan at any time, and in so doing end any
liability for future payments to the pension fund, save those specifically guaranteed.
545 F.2d at 603. Contra, Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc. v. Glazer, 144 N.J. Super. 152, 365 A.2d
1, 23 (Sup. Ct. Ch. 1976) (upholding a New Jersey statute similar to the Minnesota statute
stricken by the Eighth Circuit in White Motor Corp. v. Malone, 545 F.2d 599 (8th Cir. 1976),
based upon the reasoning of the subsequently reversed district court opinion in Malone, 412
F. Supp. 372 (D. Minn. 1976)).
60. Ralph Nader, as well as other commentators, maintained that the traditional
"bargaining through representatives" approach broke down in the area of retirement benefits
due to certain conflicts of interest: (1) union officials, because of their long service, are among
the chief beneficiaries of the present pension planning system; and (2) bargaining for slight,
but illusory, benefits wins more re-elections for unions and union leaders than securing the
ability to threat-in dissident bargaining unit employees with the argument that a change in
bargaining representatives might result in the loss to employees of their pensions. H.R. 2
Hearings, supra note 48, at 35, 251, 421-22. Representative Dent took a more balanced view:
Up to now we have had some adherence to the so-called enterprise system and the
unions' right to negotiate. Some of us think it is still a pretty good thing to do.
However, when we find situations are getting out of hand, we move in, but we don't
want the reform to kill what we are trying to reform.
H.R. 2 Hearings, supra note 48, at 283. Similarly, Senator Long thought that if collective
bargaining under ERISA resulted, for example, in the receipt of benefits by only 50% of the
employees who worked for an employer who maintained a plan, "we have written a very poor
law. We have fixed it up so that the business agent took care of the business agent, so that
. . [the employer] took care of . . . [the employer], but half of those working people
suffered very badly." Senate Finance Hearing, supra note 49, at 341.
61. See H.R. 2 Hearings, supra note 48, at 328, 336-37 (remarks of Jacob Sheinkman,
General Secretary-Treasurer, Amalgamated Clothing Workers). It should be noted that such
tensions, however, are basically inconsistent with the position that retirement benefits constitute a deferred payment of wages earned by the participant. See Halperin, Retirement Security and Tax Equity: An Evaluation of ERISA, 17 B.C. IND. & COM. L. REv. 739, 746, 748
(1976); notes 50 and 51 and accompanying text supra.
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in either reduced benefits or plan terminations. 2 Thus, two competing interests had to be balanced: the desire to encourage creation
of private plans that would provide retirement benefits for the fifty
percent of the labor force 3 without such coverage against the desire
to establish meaningful vesting standards.
Closely allied to the question of cost was the issue whether to
require retroactive vesting for service completed and benefits accrued prior to enactment of ERISA. The Nixon administration
noted the cost of such retroactivity would be very high-an assumption disputed by some legislators." Furthermore, former Secretary
of the Treasury Shultz contended that retroactive vesting would
"second-guess all of the decisions" between union and management
as to what purchases ought to be made with the pension dollar-greater benefits versus faster vesting. 5 Accordingly, witnesses
at the congressional hearings on ERISA suggested various compromises regarding retroactivity. 6 Witnesses also contended that the
contemplated statutory vesting rules should vary with the type of
employer maintaining the plan, the type of plan involved, the degree of mobility inherently required of employees in particular occupations, and the voluntary or involuntary nature of an employee's
termination. 7 On the other hand, many management representa62. See S. REP. No. 93-383, supra note 19, at 18; H. R. REP.No. 93-807, supra note 19, at
19. Note that plan amendments which have the effect of reducing benefits already accrued
by participants are subject to substantial limitations. Section 411 (d) (6) of the Internal
Revenue Code provides: "A plan shall be treated as not satisfying the requirements of this
section if the accrued benefit of a participant is decreased by an amendment of the plan, other
than an amendment described in § 412 (c) (8)." Section 412 (c) (8) allows certain retroactive
plan amendments, subject to strict timeliness, procedural, and substantive limitations.
63. S. REP. No. 93-383, supra note 19, at 13.
64. See S. REp. No. 93-127, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 20 (1973)[hereinafter cited as S. REP.
No. 93-127].
65. Senate Finance Hearings, supra note 49, at 345.
66. The suggested compromises included: (1) counting prior service in determining the
percentage vested only as to benefits accruing in the future, Senate Finance Hearings,supra
note 49, at 951-52 (pt.2); (2) treating the additional costs attributable to such vesting as a
"past service" cost, which could be funded over a fairly long period, Id. at 1044; and (3)
limiting retroactive vesting credit to employees who have attained at least age 45 by ERISA's
effective date, as proposed by Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, see S. REP.
No. 92-1150, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 31 (1972) (proposal of the Senate Committee on Labor and
Public Welfare). In 1973, however, the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare
abandoned the age 45 limitation on retroactive vesting because it tended to be arbitrary.
Furthermore, eliminating the age-based cut-off would result in only marginal cost increases-roughly 9% of the current plan cost or 2% of the overall payroll cost. S. REP. No.
93-127, supra note 64, at 20. Some representatives of organized labor even asserted that no
pension reform legislation would be acceptable if it did not require retroactivity for both
benefit accrual rates and vesting schedules. Senate Finance Hearings,supra note 49, at 248,
380. Witnesses at the hearings argued, sometimes submitting supporting briefs, that legislation requiring retroactive vesting would not be unconstitutional. Id. at 723-42, 839, 1008.
67. S. REP. No. 93-127, supra note 64, at 18-19.
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tives advocated alternative vesting schedules to accomodate such
factors as the myriad vesting schedules in effect and the varying
compositions of different industries' work forces."5 Generally, they
suggested any schedule be permitted so long as it was as liberal as
the statutory standard." In order to effect that scheme, the department with jurisdiction over minimum vesting could be authorized
to grant variances on the basis of comparability." The various factors measuring comparability were proposed.7 ' It was also suggested
that Congress permit existing plans to qualify by adopting one of
three schedules contained in the various bills,72 while requiring
plans established in the future to adopt a single statutorily mandated vesting standard.7 3
The Statute-Proposalsand Compromises
The bill passed by the Senate required new plans to adopt a
graduated five-to-fifteen year vesting schedule.74 Plans in existence
on the date of the bill's enactment could retain a ten year "cliff"
vesting schedule75 if the plan contained such a schedule on and after
that date.7" The House bill not only offered both of those rules as
alternatives, but in addition, permitted the age-weighted "rule of
forty-five" discussed below.77
The different vesting standards for existing and new plans contained in the Senate bill would have achieved the House goal of
providing "adequate flexibility" to the hundreds of thousands of
68. Senate FinanceHearings, supra note 49, at 275.
69. Id. at 275, 392, 858.
70. H.R. 2 Hearings, supra note 48, at 165, 384, 386-87.
71. Senate Finance Hearings, supra note 49, at 838-39, 924-25; H.R. 2 Hearings, supra
note 48, at 387.
72. S. 4, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 202, 119 CONG. REC. 93 (1973) (30% vested after 8 years of
covered service and 10% per year additional vesting thereafter) reprinted in I LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY, supra note 21, at 117-21; S. 1179, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 322, 119 CONG. REc. 7415
(1973) (25% after 5 years of plan participation and 5% per year thereafter), reprinted in I
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 21, at 235-39; S. 1631, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 2 (a), 119 CONG.
REc. 12926 (1973) (rule of 50-50% vesting when sum of age and years of participation equals
50 (or upon completion of 3 continuous years of service, if later) and 10% per year thereafter),
reprinted in I LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 21, at 328-29.
73. Senate Finance Hearings, supra note 49, at 845, 951. This was similar to the original
approach taken in H.R. 2 as introduced. H.R. 2, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 203, 119 CONG. REC.
37 (1973) reprinted in I LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 21, at 53-56.
74. For an explanation of the "5 to 15 year graduated vesting schedule" see text accompanying notes 86-87 infra.
75. For an explanation of the "10 year cliff" vesting schedule see text accompanying notes
80-85 infra.
76. H.R. 4200, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 221, 119 CONG. REC. 30428 (1973) as passed the
Senate, reprinted in II LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 21, at 1901-03.
77. H.R. REP. No. 93-807, supra note 19, at 54.
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existing retirement plans. However, in ERISA Congress adopted the
House approach requiring all employee pension benefit plans to
meet one of three minimum vesting schedules for accrued benefits
derived from employer contributions." These three options must be
applied to all of a participant's years of service; composite arrangements employing one rule for certain years of service and another
rule for other years are prohibited."9
Under the first option, "ten year full" vesting,"° an employee with
at least ten years of service must have a 100% nonforfeitable right
to his "accrued benefit derived from employer contributions"; 8'
however, the plan may defer all vesting during the first nine years
of service." The "full vesting" option affords participants total vesting protection after the completion of a reasonably short period of
service. 3 However, this cliff vesting has been criticized because it
gives an employer a great incentive to peremptorily dismiss employees rather than absorb the sharp increase in plan costs that occurs
when the employees' rights to accrued benefits become 100% vested
upon completion of the tenth year of service.84 Congress undoubtedly permitted plans to continue cliff vesting schedules because of
their inherent simplicity: the extensive record-keeping and consequential high administrative costs which may be involved in accounting for partially vested rights are avoided under this approach. 5
A second vesting option is the "five-to-fifteen year graduated"
schedule under which a participant must have a twenty-five percent
nonforfeitable interest in his accrued benefits attributable to em78. ERISA, § 203 (a) (2), 29 U.S.C. § 1053 (a) (2) (Supp. V 1975); I.R.C. § 411 (a) (2).
79. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 11.411 (a)- 3 (a) (3), 40 Fed. Reg. 51,422 (Nov. 5, 1975).
80. Under the "cliff" or "full vesting" alternative, a participant has no vested right to any
of his employer-derived accrued benefits until he satisfies certain service related requirements. When those requirements are met, the participant's rights to the accrued benefits
previously credited to him become fully vested. Thereafter, the participant has an immediate
and fully vested right to any accrued benefits subsequently derived from employer contributions. McGILL, FUNDAMENTALS OF PRIVATE PENSIONS 131 (3d ed. 1965) [hereinafter cited as
McGiL[.
81. ERISA, § 203 (a) (2) (A), 29 U.S.C. § 1053 (a) (2) (A) (Supp. V 1975); I.R.C. § 411
(a) (2) (A).
82. See note 80 supra.
83. H.R. REP. No. 93-807, supra note 19, at 20, 55. For example, once an employee serves
10 years he has greater vesting protection under the 10 year full vesting approach than under
a 5 to 15 graduated vesting schedule. This is because under a graduated vesting schedule, a
specified percentage of a participant's accrued benefits vests only as specified units of service
are completed. McGILL, supra note 80, at 132. Thus, under the latter system a participant
may not become fully vested until the beginning of his 16th year of service.
84. Speech by John Hall, Association for Advanced Life Underwriting, at 12 (May 10,
1974); S. REP. No. 93-383, supra note 19, at 46.
85. H.R. REP. No. 93-807, supra note 19, at 55.

19771

Forfeitures for Cause under ERISA

ployer contributions after five years of service." For the next five
years of service his accrued benefit must vest at the rate of an
additional five percent per year so that the participant's interest is
fifty percent vested after ten years. During the last five years of
service, the accrued benefits must become nonforfeitable at the rate
of an additional ten percent per year, resulting in complete nonforfeitability after fifteen years of service. This option permits gradual
vesting on an age-neutral basis, unlike the "rule of forty-five" vesting option discussed below. The advantages of the graduated vesting approach lie in its recognition of some vesting at a relatively
early point in time and the minimization of cost which results from
7
its gradual nature.1
The third alternative is the age-weighted "rule of forty-five,"" a
variant of the controversial "rule of fifty" advocated by the Nixon
administration. Under this option, a participant must have a nonforfeitable right to at least fifty percent of his accrued benefits attributable to employer contributions when, after five years of service, the sum of his age and years of service equals forty-five. Thereafter, his nonforfeitable rights must approach full vesting at the rate
of ten percentage points for each of the following five years. This
option was designed for firms that wish to provide faster vesting for
their more mature employees than for their younger employees. 0
The Senate conferees' added to the House bill's rule of forty-five
alternative 2 the requirement that plans grant an employee who
completes ten years of service a nonforfeitable interest in at least
fifty percent of his accrued benefit at that time, with an additional
ten percent vesting for each additional year of service thereafter.
Nevertheless, there was concern that even the modified rule of fortyfive might lead to hiring discrimination against older workers, and
86. ERISA, § 203 (a) (2)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 1053 (a) (2) (B) (Supp. V 1975); I.R.C. § 411 (a)
(2) (B).
87. H.R. REP. No. 93-807, supra note 19, at 55. See Hearings on General Tax Reform,
Panel Discussions Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (pt. 7)
(1973).
88. ERISA, § 203 (a)(2)(C), 29 U.S.C. § 1053 (a)(2)(C) (Supp. V 1975); I.R.C. § 411
(a)(2)(C).
89. See S. 1631, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 2 (a) (2), 119 CONG. REc. 12926 (1973); Senate
Finance Hearings, supra note 49, at 336 (remarks of Secretary of the Treasury Schultz).
90. H.R. REP. No. 93-807, supra note 19, at 19, 55.
91. Because the House and Senate bills were substantially different, conferees from the
tax and labor committees of the House and the Senate met for 20 days in executive session
to reconcile the inconsistencies. III LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 21, at 4276.
92. See text accompanying note 88 supra.
93. 120 CONG. REc. 29940 (1974) (remarks of Sen. Javits), reprinted in III LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY, supra note 21, at 4764-65.
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ten year cliff vesting might prevent participants with an average
length of service from obtaining vested benefits. 4 Consequently,
ERISA section 3022 (a)(1)"5 specifically directs the Joint Pension
Task Force" to gather evidence on the operation of these vesting
rules in order to determine whether they adequately fulfill the needs
of the nation's work force.
The Senate conferees also succeeded" in eliminating the House
bill's provisions that would have: (1) phased-in the vesting requirement;98 (2) permitted plans to retroactively decrease vested benefits without the consent of the Secretary of Labor;99 and (3) permitted, in certain cases, indefinite delays in achieving compliance with
the vesting requirements. 10
The Treasury Regulations
While Title II of ERISA, the tax provisions, defines the term
"nonforfeitable" only negatively by listing certain permitted forfeitures,'"' both the temporary and final Treasury regulations provide
that:
94. Id.
95. 29 U.S.C. § 1222 (a) (1) (Supp. V 1975).
96. The duties assigned under Title IIIof ERISA to the Joint Pension Task Force are to
be carried out by "[tihe staffs of the Committee on Ways and Means and the Committee
on Education and Labor of the House of Representatives, the Joint Committee on Internal
Revenue Taxation, and the Committee on Finance and the Committee on Labor and Public
Welfare of the Senate . . ."ERISA, § 3021, 29 U.S.C. § 1221 (Supp. V 1975).
97. 120 CONG. REc. 29940 (1974) (remarks of Sen. Javits), reprinted in III LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY, supra note 21, at 4765.
98. H.R. 2, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. § 203 (a) (2) (D) (as passed by the House) (1974), reprinted in III LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 21, at 3975. The House conferees conceded
this point for the reason that costs to the employer which would result from financing the
minimum vesting standards were expected to be relatively moderate. 120 CONG. REC. 29199
(1974) (remarks of Rep. Ullman), reprinted in III
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 21, at 4675.
99. Id. §§ 203 (f)(1), 501, reprinted in III LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 21, at 3978,
4041.
100. Id. § 501, reprinted in III LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 21, at 4041.
101. I.R.C. § 411 (a) (3); see also ERISA, § 203 (a) (3), 29 U.S.C. § 1053 (a) (3) (Supp. V
1975). For instance, an otherwise nonforfeitable accrued benefit may be forfeited in the event
that a participant dies prior to reaching the plan's normal or early retirement age. I.R.C. §
411 (a) (3) (A); see also ERISA, § 203 (a) (3) (A), 29 U.S.C. § 1053 (a) (3) (A) (Supp. V 1975).
This exception to the general rule of nonforfeitability is, in turn, subject to an exception where
a survivor annuity is payable as provided in I.R.C. § 401 (a) (11). Note that, historically, while
defined contribution plans have not provided for this type of forfeiture, defined benefit plans
usually have done so. See Lee, Joint and Survivor Annuities under ERISA-The Gamble on
Survival, 3 J. CORP. TAX. 241, 242, 244 (1976). Section 3 (19) of ERISA provides, for Title I
purposes only, that "[the terr 'nonforfeitable' when used with respect to a pension benefit
or right means a claim obtained by a participant or his beneficiary to that part of an immediate or deferred benefit under a pension plan which arises from the participant's service, which
is unconditional, and which is legally enforceable against the plan." 29 U.S.C. § 1002 (19)
(Supp. V 1975).
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a right to an accrued benefit is considered to be nonforfeitable at
a particular time if, at that time and thereafter, it is an unconditional right [with the exception of the statutorily permitted forfeitures] . . .[A] right which, at a particular time, is conditioned

upon a subsequent event, subsequent performance, or subsequent
forbearance, is a forfeitable right at that time.0 2
In this regard, the legislative history specifically indicates that the
minimum nonforfeitable rights to accrued benefits can not be forfeited because of a participant's disloyalty to the employer.0 3 However, the above-quoted Treasury regulation continues: "to the extent that rights are not required to be nonforfeitable to satisfy the
minimum vesting standards, or the nondiscrimination standards of
§401 (a)(4), they may be forfeited without regard to the limitation
on forfeitability required by this section."'0 4 The regulations offer
the following example of the bad boy forfeitures permitted by that
clause.
Corporation A's plan provided that an employee is fully vested in
his employer-derived accrued benefit after completion of 5 years
of service. The plan also provided that, if an employee works for a
competitor he forfeits his rights in the plan. Such provision could
result in the forfeiture of an employee's rights which are required
to be nonforfeitable under section 411 and therefore the plan would
not satisfy the requirements of section 411. If the plan limited the
forfeiture to employees who completed less than 10 years of service,
the plan would not fail to satisfy the requirements of section 411
because the forfeitures under this provision are limited to rights
which are in excess of the minimum required to be nonforfeitable
under section 411 (a)(2)(A).' 5
102.
§ 1.411
103.
104.
§ 1.411
adds:

Temp. Treas. Reg. § 11.411 (a)- 4 (a), 40 Fed. Reg. 51,423 (Nov. 5,1975). Treas. Reg.
(a)-4 (a), 42 Fed. Reg. 42,326 (Aug. 23, 1977).
See notes 19-20 and accompanying text supra.
Temp. Treas. Reg. § 11.411 (a)- 4 (a), 40 Fed. Reg. 51,423 (Nov. 5, 1975). Treas. Reg.
(a)- 4 (a), 42 Fed. Reg. 42,326 (Aug. 23, 1977), after the language quoted in the text

Rights which are required to be prospectively nonforfeitable under the vesting
standards are nonforfeitable and may not be forfeited until it is determined that
such rights are, in fact, in excess of the vesting standards. Thus, employees have a
right to vest in the accrued benefits if they continue in employment of employers
maintaining the plan unless a forfeitable event recognized by section 411 occurs.
For example, if a plan covered employees in Division A of Corporation X under a
plan utilizing a 10-year-100 percent vesting schedule, the plan could not forfeit
employees' rights on account of their moving to service in Division B of Corporation
X prior to completion of 10 years of service even though employees are not vested
at that time.
105. Id. § 11.411 (a)-4 (c) (example 1), 40 Fed. Reg. 51,424 (Nov. 5, 1975). Tress. Reg. §
1. 411 (a)-4 (c) (example 1), 42 Fed. Reg. 42,327 (Aug. 23, 1977).
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The Treasury drafters' rationale was that, where an employee
pension benefit plan grants a more liberal rate of vesting than required under ERISA, then such extra vesting may revert to one of
the statutory minimums, e.g., no vesting until ten years of service
have been completed, if the participant in question should violate
the plan's bad boy clause.'0° Clearly, the same reasoning would
apply to the validity of bad boy clauses during the interim period
between the effective date of the preemption section and the vesting
provisions.
In a National Office Technical Advice Memorandum," 7 the Internal Revenue Service recently considered a plan which provided ten
year graduated vesting, a more liberal schedule than required by
ERISA. Under the plan, a participant who had completed less than
ten years of service would forfeit his otherwise vested benefits if he
violated the bad boy clause. The Service's district office took the
position that the plan would not qualify unless it was shown, using
the ten year cliff alternative, that the plan would be able to meet
the nondiscrimination requirements of section 401 (a)(4).'s0 The taxpayer argued that the bad boy clause was not inherently discriminatory.
The National Office pointed out that the example in the temporary regulations was based on the rule that rights may not be forfeited which are required to be nonforfeitable in order to satisfy the
minimum vesting standard or the nondiscrimination requirements.
Consequently, the Office concluded that the taxpayer must demonstrate the plan would satisfy the nondiscriminationrequirements of
section 401 (a) (4), using the ten year cliff vesting alternative in order
to qualify under section 401(a). However, the memorandum does
not indicate whether the requisite demonstration could be satisfied
by proving that the forfeitures resulting solely from application of
the bad boy clause would not be twice as high'0 9 among the rankand-file employees as among employees in the prohibited group. A
106. Credited Service, supra note 44, at 465.
107. A copy of the Memorandum is on file with the author.
108. I.R.C. § 401(a)(4).
109. Rev. Proc. 75-49, 1975-2 C.B. 584, provides in part, if the turnover rate among the
rank-and-file employees is more than twice the turnover rate among the prohibited group,
then more rapid vesting than the statutory minimum will be required, i.e., 40% after 4 years
of employment, 45% after 5 years, 50% after 6 and 10% per year thereafter-the "four-forty"
vesting schedule. However, until the company has achieved 5 years of work experience more
liberal turnover rules apply. This approach to turnover suggests that in applying a discrimination test to a bad boy clause, it might be appropriate to compare the rates of forfeitures
among the rank-and-file and prohibited groups that result solely from application of the
plan's bad boy clause, and not those that result merely from the all-or-nothing nature of the
10 year cliff vesting approach.

1977]

Forfeitures for Cause under ERISA

more burdensome alternative would require a showing that forfeitures would be within those limits even after application of both the
plan's ten year vesting schedule and its bad boy clause. Moreover,
because of the given facts the memorandum does not address the
question whether the plan sponsor of a pre-ERISA plan could show
that a post-ERISA graduated vesting schedule, subject to a bad boy
clause, would satisfy the nondiscrimination requirements of section
401 (a), where the pre-ERISA vesting schedule was the same and
the pre-ERISA plan contained a bad boy clause." '
The drafters of the regulations did not address and probably did
not consider the threshold question whether bad boy provisions
would be enforceable at all under federal common law after the
effective date of the ERISA preemption provisions. The search for
an answer to that question entails an examination of the preemption
doctrine and, in particular, the scope of ERISA's preemption provisions.
ERISA's PREEMPTION PROVISIONS
The preemption doctrine has been described"' as the means for
determining how regulatory authority has been allocated between
the states and the federal government under the supremacy clause
of the Constitution."' Generally, two tests are applied by the judiciary to determine whether state law has been preempted: whether
state regulation would "conflict" with the federal regulation in
question, and whether Congress intended to "occupy" the area in
question to the exclusion of the states." 3 As regards the conflict test,
the cases finding that state law has been preempted
110. In the wake of criticism of the position taken by the Service in Rev. Proc. 75-49, 19752 C.B. 584, (see Credited Service, supra note 44, at 382-83), the Service retreated. Rev. Proc.
76-11, 1976-1 C.B. 550, in effect, created a grandfather clause for pre-ERISA plans. A safe
harbor is granted:
in the case of any plan which had previously been the subject of a favorable advance
determination letter which has not been revoked, [so long as] the percentage of
vesting of each participant provided under the plan, as amended, is not less (at
every point) than that provided under the vesting schedule of the plan upon which
such most recent prior determination letter was based ...
Arguably, a plan would meet this test, even though employing a 10 years of service graduated
vesting schedule that was subject to forfeiture for bad boy activities engaged in before completion of 10 years of service, where the prior plan had a 10 years of participationgraduated
vesting schedule, with a similar bad boy clause. The author has successfully employed this
argument in obtaining a favorable advance determination letter.
111. See generally Note, The Preemption Doctrine: Shifting Perspectives on Federalism
and the Burger Court, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 623 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Preemption
Doctrine].
112. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl.2.
113. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1946). See generally Preemption
Doctrine, supra note 111, at 624-39.
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tend to fall into one of two categories: (1) those that reflect the
concern that "one forum would enjoin, as illegal, conduct which
the other forum would. find legal" and those that reflect the concern "that the [application of state law by] state courts would
restrict the exercise of rights guaranteed by the Federal Acts.""'
The occupation test, in turn, focuses upon whether Congress intended to foreclose state regulation in a particular field." 5 Where
Congress is silent, the courts have found preemption where a clear
implication of congressional intent to occupy the field can be
shown."' However, Congress may also state such an intent directly," 7 as it did in section 514 of ERISA, which took effect on
January 1, 1976.118
Section 514 (a) provides that Title I of ERISA,"8 the labor title,
and Title IV,1'2 the termination insurance provisions, shall "supersede any and all State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter
relate to any employee benefit plan. . . "' Section 514 (c)(1), in
turn, defines the term "state law" to include "all laws, decisions,
rules, regulations, or other State action having the effect of law, of
any State.' 22 It is beyond question that Congress intended by this
provision to make federal law the sole authority regulating the field
of employee benefit plans.' 23 The scope of federal regulation clearly
includes areas such as reporting and disclosure requirements 24 and
fiduciary obligations, 25 generally effective January 1, 1975.121 It also
encompasses the application of ERISA's nonforfeitability provisions,'2 to plans in existence on January 1, 1974, for plan years
beginning after December 31, 1975.12 A more difficult question is
whether state law, under the Erie doctrine, 2 1 or whether federal
114. Machinists v. Wisconsin Emp. Rel'ns Comm'n, 427 U.S. 132, 138 (1976). See Hines
v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941).
115. Florida Avocado Growers v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 146 (1963).
116. Cloverleaf Butter Co. v. Patterson, 315 U.S. 148, 157 (1942). For a discussion of the
factors used to determine the implied congressional intent see note 145 infra.
117. See, e.g., Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act, § 6 (b), 15 U.S.C. § 755 (b) (Supp.
V 1975).
118. ERISA, § 514 (a), 29 U.S.C. § 1144 (a) (Supp. V 1975).
119. 29 U.S.C. § 1001-1144 (Supp. V 1975).
120. Id. §§ 1301-1381.
121. Id. § 1144 (a). The full text of § 514 is set out in note 10 supra.
122. Id. § 1144 (c) (1).
123. 120 CONG. REc. 29197 (1974) (remarks of Rep. Dent), reprinted in mI LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY, supra note 21, at 4670-71.
124. ERISA, tit. I, part 1, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1021-31.
125. Id. tit. I, part 4, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1101-14.
126. Id. §§ 111 (b) (1), 414 (a), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1031 (b) (1), 1114 (a).
127. Id. tit. I, part 2, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1051-61.
128. Id. § 211 (b) (2), 29 U.S.C. § 1061 (b) (2).
129. Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
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common law' 0 applies to bad boy clauses during the gap period
between the respective effective dates of ERISA's preemption and
nonforfeitability provisions. Clearly, where federal statutes determine rights and liabilities, federal common law rather than state
law applies.' 3' The Erie doctrine "is inapplicable to those areas of
judicial decision within which the policy of the law is so dominated
by the sweep of federal statutes that legal relations which they effect
must be deemed governed by federal law having its source in those
' 32
statutes, rather than by local law." '
The ERISA Conference Report stated that all actions to enforce
benefit rights or to recover benefits under a plan "are to be regarded
as arising under the laws of the United States in similar fashion to
those actions brought under section 301 of the Labor-Management
Relations Act of 1947,'1 33 which the Supreme Court has held are
subject to a federal common law.' 34 The development of federal
common law under section 301 of the Labor-Management Relations
Act of 1947' 31 indicates that courts are required to examine the policy of the federal legislation. They may also refer to state law if it is
compatible with the federal policy.' 31 Senator Javits, in the floor
debate on the conference bill, stated that it was intended "that a
body of Federal substantive law be developed by the courts to deal
with issues involving rights and obligations under private welfare
37
and pension plans.'
Another convincing indication that federal substantive law
should be used to interpret and enforce employee benefit plan terms
is the development of the preemption provision in the various House
130. See notes 36-40 and accompanying text supra.
131. Thurber v. Western Conf. of Teamsters Pension Plan, 542 F.2d 1106, 1108 (9th Cir.
1976).
132. Sola Elec. Co. v. Jefferson Elec. Co., 317 U.S. 173, 176 (1942); accord, Clearfield
Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 366 (1943).
133. H.R. REP. No. 93-1280, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 327 (1974).
134. Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 456-57 (1957).
135. Section 301 (a) provides:
(a) Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization
representing employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined in this chapter, or between any such labor organizations, may be brought in any district court
of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the
amount in controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the parties.
29 U.S.C. § 185 (a) (1970).
136. Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 457 (1957). Lincoln Mills held that a
federal common law should be fashioned under § 301 (a) of the Labor-Management Relations
Act of 1947.
137. 120 CONG. REc. 29942 (1974), reprinted in Ill LGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 21, at
4771.
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and Senate bills. House Resolution 2, the bill passed by the House,
provided that, except for actions brought by a participantor beneficiary to recover benefits due him under the terms of his plan or
to clarify his rights to future benefits under the terms of the plan,
the labor provisions of H.R. 2 preempted state laws "insofar as
they may now or hereafter relate to the reporting and disclosure
responsibilities, of persons acting on behalf of any employee benefit
plan to which part 1 applies."' 3 8 A separate subsection preempted
state laws that related to nonforfeitability of participants'benefits,
funding requirements, adequacy of financing, portability requirements, or insurance of pension benefits. '
The Nixon administration's bill' was structured similarly, although it more explicitly left to state law the interpretation of the
plan document insofar as it related to the amount of benefits due a
particular participant. At the Senate Finance Committee Hearings,
a Department of Labor representative interpreted this bill to mean
that state law would apply to actions brought by participants and
beneficiaries to recover benefits due under the plan or to clarify
rights to future benefits.'4 1
In contrast, the bill passed by the Senate' preempted any and
all state laws relating to matters regulated by ERISA. Section 699
(b) of that bill permitted state court jurisdiction in any action by a
fiduciary seeking an interpretation of the plan documents. However,
in such actions, state laws would be superseded to the extent they
related "to the fiduciary, reporting and disclosure responsibilities of
persons acting for or on behalf of employee benefit plans. . . except
insofar as they may relate the amount of benefits due beneficiaries
under the terms of the plan."'' Because the exceptions and restrictions contained in the prior bills were discarded, the absolute language of ERISA section 514 would, under traditional statutory construction, apply to suits for benefits requiring interpretation of plan
terms.'4 From this history, it appears that the scope of ERISA's
138. H.R. 2, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. § 514 (a) (as passed by the House) 119 CONG. REc. 4782
(1974), reprinted in HI LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 21, at 4057.
139. Id. § 514 (c), reprintedin III LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 21, at 4058-59.
140. S. 1557, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 14, 119 CONG. REc. 12061, 12075 (1973) reprinted in I
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 21, at 319-21.
141. Senate FinanceHearings,supra note 49, at 449 (written statement of the Department
of Labor, presented by Paul J. Fasser, Assistant Secretary of Labor for Labor-Management).
142. H.R. 4200, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 699, 119 CONG. REc. 30428 (as passed by the Senate)
(1973), reprinted in II LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 21, at 2103-05.
143. Id. § 599 (b) (emphasis added).
144. Nat'l Automatic Laundry and Cleaning Council v. Shultz, 443 F.2d 689, 706 (D.C.
Cir. 1971); cf. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., 419 U.S. 186, 199-200 (1974) (finding that
a conference committee's deletion of an expansive phrase in § 2 (a) of the House version of
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preemption includes state law interpretation of employee benefit
plan provisions. Thus, federal common law interpreting such provisions must develop. 45
Congress could have drafted the ERISA preemption provision to
apply piecemeal as the various substantive areas became effective,
but it did not do so. Consequently, the clear language and the legislative intent of the preemption provision, under established precedent concerning federal common law, strongly support the Amory
court's holding that during the interim period the effect and operation of bad boy clauses may not be judged by pre-existing state law,
but must be governed by a federal common law to be derived from
ERISA. However, the determination of whether Amory correctly
derived such federal law requires an examination of the general preERISA state law regarding bad boy clauses, the policies underlying
ERISA, and the interplay between those two concerns.

PRE-ERISA

STATE BAD Boy AUTHORITY

Dischargefor Cause

Prior to ERISA, few cases involved employer attempts to deny
private sector employees their otherwise vested retirement benefits
as punishment for their misconduct or dishonesty, "6 rather than
competitive behavior. However, in recent years, perhaps due to the
growth of the private pension market, more cases have considered
the former issue, and have generally upheld those provisions. "7 For
the Robinson-Patman Act "strongly militates against a judgment that Congress intended a
result that it expressly declined to enact."); Tri-Lakes S.S. Co. v. Comm'r, 146 F.2d 970, 972
(6th Cir. 1945) ("It has long been a recognized rule of statutory construction that the omission
by amendment, of qualifying language, discloses an intent to include the class previously
excluded by the omitted qualifying language.").
145. Lee, supra note 1, at 47. Apart from the portions of the legislative history discussed
in the text that deal with explicit congressional preemption concerning vesting and bad boy
clauses during the gap period, other parts of the legislative history would, under Rice v. Santa
Fe Elev. Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947), and Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, 411 U.S.
624, 633 (1973), support a conclusion of implied preemption in view of: (1) the pervasiveness
of federal regulation; (2) the objectives and effects of character of federal and state regulation;
(3) the dominant national or federal interest in the field; and (4) the need for uniformity of
regulation. The legislative history of ERISA clearly shows the presence of all of these factors,
particularly the need for national uniformity in order to eliminate conflicting and inconsistent
state regulation. 120 CONG. REc. 29197 (1974) (remarks of Rep. Dent), reprinted in I
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 21, at 4670. See S. REP. No. 93-127, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 29
(1973).
146. See, e.g., Lamphere v. Old Second Nat'l Bank, 39 I1. App.
3d 610, 350 N.E.2d 272
(1976); Annot., 76 A.L.R.2d 568 (1966).
147. Taylor v. Gen. Tel. Co., 20 Cal. App. 3d 70, 97 Cal. Rptr. 349 (1971); Bird v. Connecticut Power Co., 144 Conn. 456, 133 A.2d 894 (1957); White v. Crane Co., 147 So. 2d 32 (Ct.
App. La. 1962); Marcus v. Boston Edison Co., 56 N.E.2d 910 (Sup. Ct. Mass. 1944); Gitelson
v. Dupont, 17 N.Y.2d 46, 215 N.E.2d 336 (Ct. App. 1966); Taint v. Kroger Co., 47 Ohio Op.2d
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example, a California court' allowed a denial of benefits to a death
beneficiary even though the acts of dishonesty in question were not
discovered until after the participant's death. Moreover, in 1970,
the Texas Supreme Court "9 held that a retirement plan committee's
determination of a participant's termination for dishonest conduct
is conclusive absent a showing of a lack of good faith in the application of the plan's provisions.' 0 Lack of good faith was not shown by
either the committee's reliance on an attorney's definition of dishonesty or in its failure to hold a hearing, because none was requested since the participant admitted the conduct in question.'5 '
However, recent decisions have construed "discharge for cause" bad
boy clauses very narrowly. For example, where a former participant's embezzlement and disclosure of trade secrets were not discovered until after termination of employment, his termination was
not considered a "discharge for cause."' 5 2 Similarly, a provision forfeiting an employee's vested interest upon "confessions" to a felony
or misdemeanor was held to require "confession" in the strict crimi53
nal law sense.'
Post-terminationCompetitive Behavior
Most pre-ERISA litigation concerning divestitures of vested
rights was generated by post-termination competitive behavior.
Plans commonly provided that a participant's retirement benefits
would be reduced or terminated if, after retirement or termination
of employment, the participant engaged in conduct that was com272, 247 N.E.2d 794 (Ct. C.P. 1967); Ellis v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 172 S.C. 338, 174 S.E.
19 (1934). But see Leongard v. Metal & Thermit Corp., 204 F. Supp. 74 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
See generally Note, Pension Plans and the Rights of the Retired Worker, 70 COLUM. L. REv.
909, 917-18 (1970). Cf. Lieberman v. Cook, 343 F. Supp. 558 (W.D. Pa. 1972).
148. Reese v. Administrative Comm. of Profit-Sharing Trust, 218 Cal. App.2d 646, 32 Cal.
Rptr. 818 (1963).
149. Neuhoff Bros. Packers Mgm't Corp. v. Wilson, 453 S.W.2d 472 (Tex. 1970). In
Neuhoff, the profit-sharing plan: (1) mandated forfeiture of a participant's entire account
balance in the event of termination for dishonest or fraudulent conduct; (2) granted to the
plan committee authority to make all determinations concerning a particular participant's
benefits; and (3) stated that the committee's decisions would be final, binding, and conclusive on all parties.
150. For a discussion of the validity of the court's standard of review in light of the
prohibition against exculpatory clauses found in ERISA, § 410 (a), 29 U.S.C. § 1110 (a)
(Supp. V 1975), see Lee, (ERISA)-Fiduciary Responsibilities and Prohibited Transactions,
A-37 (Tax Mgrn't Portfolio number 308, 1975).
151. 453 S.W.2d 472, 474-75 (1970); accord, Miller v. Assoc. Pension Trusts, Inc., 541 F.2d
726, 729 (8th Cir. 1976).
152. See Lamphere v. Old Second Nat'l Bank, 39 Ill. App. 3d 610, 350 N.E.2d 272 (1976);
accord, Anger v. Bender, 31 Ill. App. 3d 877, 335 N.E.2d 122 (1975).
153. Helzer v. Mountain States Motors, Inc., 535 P.2d 517 (Ct. App. Colo. 1975).
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petitive with, or detrimental to, his former employer's business. "4
The early cases often permitted forfeitures on the theory that a
pension constituted a gratuity; thus, the employer could make or
withhold these gratuitous pension payments as he chose. "' More
recently, however, virtually all of the authorities have recognized
that retirement benefits, whether provided under a contributory or
non-contributory retirement plan,5 6 are in reality earned by the
employee, since the payments are in lieu of compensation. Hence,
pension benefits constitute deferred wages.'57
1. Policy Considerations
Unfortunately, a number of theories and approaches relied upon
by courts sustained anticompetition retirement plan provisions but
failed to address underlying policy questions. For example, some
courts based their validations of forfeiture clauses upon factors such
as whether the employee's interest vested periodically or only upon
termination of employment, 5 8 and whether a participant had failed
to comply with another contract provision, thereby empowering the
employer to revoke its pension promise. "
2.

"Employee's Choice" Rationale

The majority of pre-ERISA cases upheld anticompetition clauses
in retirement plans under an "employee's choice" rationale: such
provisions place no restraint upon the freedom of the employee,
because they do not prevent the employee from accepting employment with a competitor-he has a choice between the new job or the
60
retirement benefits.
154. See, e.g., Rochester Corp. v. Rochester, 450 F.2d 118, 123 (4th Cir. 1971); Keller v.
Graphic Systems, Inc., 422 F.Supp. 1005, 1007 (N.D. Ohio 1976); Van Pelt v. Berefco, Inc.,
60 I1. App. 2d 415, 308 N.E.2d 858, 865 (1965).
155. Forfeiture of Benefits, supra note 50, at 296.
156. The terms "contributory" and "non-contributory" distinguish between those plans
that provide benefits to participants regardless of investment of their own money in the
funding vehicle and those plans which impose sanctions for a failure to so invest. See
generally ERISA, § 204 (c) (2) (C), 29 U.S.C. § 1054 (c) (2) (C) (Supp. V 1975), where the
term "mandatory contributions" is defined as "amounts contributed to the plan by the
employee which are required as a condition of employment, as a condition of participation
in such plan, or as a condition of obtaining benefits under the plan attributable to employer
contributions."
157. See authorities cited at note 50 supra.
158. Koehn & Ptacek, supra note 53, at 83-88.
159. Forfeiture of Benefits, supra note 50, at 292.
160. Rochester Corp. v. Rochester, 450 F.2d 118, 122-23 (4th Cir. 1971); accord, Bannert
v. American Can Co., 525 F.2d 104, 109 (6th Cir. 1975); Golden v. Kentile Floors, Inc., 512
F.2d 838, 843-44 (5th Cir. 1975); Keller v. Graphic Systems, Inc., 422 F. Supp. 1005, 1012
(N.D. Ohio 1976); Miller v. Associated Pension Trusts, Inc., 396 F. Supp. 907, 911 (E.D. Mo.
1975), aff'd, 541 F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1976); Brown Stove Works, Inc. v. Kimsey, 119 Ga. App.
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Commentators strongly criticized the employee's choice analysis."' Eventually, some courts " ' voiced similar criticism:
The idea that under such forfeiture provisions an employee has a
real "freedom of choice" has been strongly criticized upon the
ground that even under noncontributory pensions [sic] plans,
benefit payments are no longer regarded as "gratuities," but as a
contractual right to deferred compensation, and that these decisions ignore the inhibitory effect of such a forfeiture clause upon
an employee in making the decision whether to accept a new job,
in that ordinarily the new employment will not compensate him
for loss of the pension, which may represent a substantial portion
of what he must depend upon when he retires and which he cannot
risk by competing." 3
3.

The "Reasonableness" Test

Gradually, the pre-ERISA cases began to equate anticompetition
clauses in retirement plans with those contained in employment
contracts. These courts recognized that under the latter clause the
employer was forced to employ legal sanctions against competing
employees while under the former clause the employer could deny
competing employees their retirement benefits. It was reasoned that
"in either instance, the employee is subject to an economic loss
should he breach the restrictive covenant.""' 4 Though this position
continued to be the minority view," 5 the significance of the equation
453, 167 S.E.2d 693 (1969); Van Pelt v. Berefco, Inc., 60 Ill.
App.2d 415, 208 N.E.2d 858, 865
(1965); Alco-Columbia Paper Serv., Inc. v. Nash, 273 So.2d 630, 632 (La. Ct. App. 1973);
Alldredge v. City Nat'l Bank, 468 S.W.2d 1 (Mo. 1971); Dollgener v. Robertson Fleet Servs.,
Inc., 527 SW.2d 277 (Tex. Civ. App. 1975). See generally Annot., 18 A.L.R.3d 1246, 1251-55
(1968).
The employee choice doctrine, as it originated in New York, see Kristt v. Whelan, 4 A.D.2d
195, 164 N.Y.S.2d 239 (Ct. App. 1957), af'd, 5 N.Y.2d 807, 181 N.Y.S.2d 205, 155 N.E.2d
116 (1958), implied that such a forfeiture may never be examined for reasonableness. See
Amory v. Boyden Associates, Inc., 434 F. Supp. 671, 672 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). The strength
of this doctrine may have been somewhat eroded by subsequent decisions. See Golden v.
Kentile Floor, Inc., 512 F.2d 838, 844 (5th Cir. 1975).
161. See, e.g., Forfeiture of Benefits, supra note 50, at 303; Case Note, 50 CORNELL L.Q.
672, 676-77 (1965).
162. Compare, Flammer v. Patton, 245 So.2d 854, 858 (Fla. 1971); Food Fair Stores, Inc.
v. Greeley, 264 Md. 105, 285 A.2d 632 (1972); Woodward v. Cadillac Overall Supply Co., 396
Mich. 379, 240 N.W.2d 710 (1976); Harris v. Bolin, 247 N.W.2d 600 (Minn. 1976); Lavey v.
Edwards, 264 Ore. 331, 505 P.2d 342, 345 (1973); Almers v. South Carolina Nat'l Bank, 217
S.E.2d 135 (S.C. 1975); Sheppard v. Blackstock Lumber Co., 85 Wash.2d 929, 540 P.2d 1373
(1975); Estate of Schroeder v. Gateway Transp. Co., 53 Wis.2d 59, 191 N.W.2d 860 (1971);
with authorities cited in note 147 supra, and Collister v. Board of Trustees of the McGee Co.
Profit Sharing Plan, 531 P.2d 989 (Colo. Ct. App. 1975); Hudson v. North Carolina Farm
Bureau, 23 N.C. App. 50, 209 S.E.2d 416 (1974).
163. Lavey v. Edwards, 264 Ore. 33, 505 P.2d 342, 345 (1973).
164. See Food Fair Stores, Inc. v. Greeley, 264 Md. 105, 285 A.2d 632 (1972).
165. See Almers v. South Carolina Nat'l Bank, 217 S.E.2d 135, 138 (S.C. 1970).
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was threefold. First, in some jurisdictions, all anticompetition restrictions were statutorily voided as restraints on trade, at least
where they were not necessary to protect the employer's interests.'"
Second, under the common law in some states, the enforceability of
contractual divestiture depended on the restraint's compliance with
a "reasonableness" test, i.e., whether it was (1) necessary to protect
the employer's interest in view of the detriment to the employee,
and (2) not harmful to the public." 7
Third, some jurisdictions, in applying the reasonableness standard, focused upon the potential injury to the public and, consequently, voided bad boy clauses as being "so unreasonable as to be
in violation of public policy."'' 8 For example, the Iowa Supreme

Court reasoned in Van Hosen v. Bankers Trust Co.:'
[Wihen a career employee retires, either voluntarily or involuntarily, he or she often experiences a traumatic economic change.
Furthermore, many pensioners cannot, at the moment, qualify for
social security and must resort to other employment for supplementary income. Usually, in such cases, work openings in the employee's accustomed field of endeavor are not readily available.
And if such a position is obtained, comparatively inconsequential
or no attendant marginal benefits are ordinarily provided, or ultimately acquired.
[Wihen retirement from any subsequent employment occurs
the result can be chaotic, absent restoration of any pension rights
166. Muggil v. Reuben H. Donnelley Corp., 62 Cal. 2d 239, 42 Cal. Rptr. 107, 348 P.2d
147, 18 A.L.R.2d 1241 (1965); Flammer v. Patton, 245 So.2d 854 (Fla. 1971); Graham v.
Hudgins, Thompson, Ball & Assoc., Inc., 540 P.2d 1161 (Okla. 1975); Holsen v. Marshall &
Ilsley Bank, 52 Wis. 2d 281, 190 N.W.2d 189 (1971).
167. See Lavey v. Edwards, 264 Ore. 331, 505 P.2d 342 (1973); accord, Woodward v.

Cadillac Overall Supply Co., 396 Mich. 379, 240 N.W.2d 710 (1976); Sheppard v. Blackstock
Lumber Co., 85 Wash. 2d 929, 540 P.2d 1373 (1975). See generally Black, Employee Agreements not to Compete, 73 H~Av. L. REv. 625, 626-27 (1960); Koehn & Ptacek, supra note 53
at 92-93. The courts generally construe any ambiguity in favor of the former participant. See,
e.g., Paddock Pool Constr'n Co. v. Monseur, 23 Ariz. App. 451, 533 P.2d 1188 (1975).
168. Van Hosen v. Bankers Trust Co., 200 N.W.2d 504 (Iowa 1971); accord, Food Fair
Stores, Inc. v. Greeley, 264 Md. 105, 285 A.2d 632 (1972); Woodward v. Cadillac Overall
Supply Co., 396 Mich. 379, 250 N.W.2d 710, 721 (dissenting opinion) (1976); Almers v. South
Carolina Nat'l Bank, 217 S.E.2d 135, 139 (S.C. 1975). The countervailing policy, under the
majority view, is apparently based upon freedom of contract principles. Dollgener v. Robertson Fleet Services, Inc., 527 S.W.2d 277, 280 (Tex. Civ. App. 1975). This approach, however,
overlooks the disparate bargaining power of the employer and employees. Furthermore, it
ignores the reality that many plans are not negotiated, but are unilaterally established by
the employer. Woodward v. Cadillac Overall Supply Co., 395 Mich. 379, 240 N.W.2d 710
(dissenting opinion) (1976).
169. 200 N.W.2d 504 (Iowa 1971).
170. Id. at 508-09.

Loyola University Law Journal

[Vol. 9

acquired through extended service with a prior employer. The
harshness of such a situation is self-evident.
Moreover, private pension plans have a humanitarian purpose
in that, like employment security, they extend to those benefitted
some degree of financial independence at a time when earning
ability and related income may be impaired or ended . . . It is in
turn evident these programs have become increasingly vital to our
socioeconomic community welfare. By the same token society
today has a material interest in the orderly development and administration of all pension plans, public or private. Thus public
policy comes into play ...
It therefore follows, the infinite forfeiture and termination of all
pension rights instantly acquired by plaintiff through prior affiliation with defendant bank, merely by accepting employment with
a competing institution, imposes an unjust and uncivic penalty on
plaintiff at the same time disproportionately benefitting these defendants.7 0
In those jurisdictions espousing the majority view that competitive behavior bad boy clauses were not void as against public policy,
commentators disagreed' on the issue whether courts should rewrite unreasonable anticompetition clauses. The majority of the
courts that considered the issue reformed such clauses, and enforced
them when the employee's competitive conduct surpassed the
ambit of a reasonable restraint. 7 ' In contrast, a frequent pre-ERISA
statutory approach was to void entirely unreasonable anticompetitive clauses, rather than to allow enforcement of the reason73
able portion.
4.

Time of Payment Considerations

When pre-ERISA bad boy clauses were voided, questions arose
concerning the appropriate time for payment of vested plan benefits. Frequently, under pre-ERISA retirement plans, benefit payments did not begin until a terminated or retired employee reached
normal retirement age. On rare occasions, when the plan committee
171. Compare Forfeiture of Benefits, supra note 50, at 299, with Koehn & Ptacek, supra
note 53, at 94. This approach would parallel the common law approach toward general anticompetition clauses in employment contracts. Forfeiture of Benefits, supra note 50, at 299.
172. Flammer v. Patton, 245 So.2d 854 (Fla. 1971); Lavey v. Edwards, 264 Ore. 331, 505
P.2d 342 (1973); Sheppard v. Blackstock Lumber Co., 85 Wash.2d 929, 540 P.2d 1373 (1975).
Contra, Woodward v. Cadillac Overall Supply Co., 396 Mich. 379, 240 N.W.2d 710 (1976);
Harris v. Bolin, 247 N.W.2d 600 (Minn. 1976).
173. See Woodward v. Cadillac Overall Supply Co., 396 Mich. 379, 240 N.W.2d 710 (1976)
("It is also significant that some states have promulgated statutes which specifically limit
the validity of non-competition forfeitures. Moreover, under these statutes, unlimited noncompetition forfeiture clauses have invariably been held invalid.").
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or trustee unsuccessfully attempted to divest a terminated employee of his vested benefits a question remained whether he would
be entitled to receive his benefits earlier than scheduled. For example, in Food Fair Stores, Inc. v. Greeley,", the plan provided that
a participant who voluntarily terminated his employment would
not be eligible to receive benefit payments until normal retirement. However, the Maryland Supreme Court ruled that a former
participant who had not reached that age was entitled to immediate payment where his account balance had been wrongfully forfeited for alleged competitive activities and transferred to the accounts of the remaining participants. After invalidating the anticompetition clause as impermissibly broad, the court reasoned that
the transfer of the participant's account balance constituted a commingling of his allocated assets with the general plan fund, thus
amounting to a conversion which entitled him to immediate recovery of their value. While possibly justifiable on public policy
grounds, this approach ignores the realities facing modern retirement plans: even in individual account plans funds are usually
commingled. Only in the trustee's records are separate accounts
established.
However, the legal theory adopted by the Greeley court appears
to be determinative in this area. Thus in Bird v. Computer Technology, Inc.,'7 the terminated employee argued that the employer's
stated intent not to pay him any benefits even when he reached
normal retirement age constituted a repudiation and anticipatory
breach of the pension promise. The court denied the plaintiff's request for immediate payment because under local law an anticipatory breach did not entitle plaintiff to acceleration of future installment payments of money.'76 In most states, however, a terminated
employee could treat such an anticipatory repudiation as a breach
of contract and receive the actuarial present value of his retirement
benefits.'7 7
Another common plan feature allows a discretionary deferral of
payment of a terminated participant's vested benefits until normal
retirement age. The object of this approach is to preclude an employee from terminating employment and using his plan benefits to
174. 264 Md. 105, 285 A.2d 632, 640 (1972).
175. 364 F. Supp. 1336 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
176. Id. at 1345 ("[Tlhe doctrine of anticipatory breach has no application [under New
York law] to contracts for the payment of money only, in installments or otherwise.").
177. See Minnesota Amusement Co. v. Larking, 299 F.2d 142, 153 (8th Cir. 1962); Stopford v. Boonton Molding Co., 56 N.J. 169, 265 A.2d 657 (1970); Annot., 46 A.L.R.3d 464
(1972).
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finance a competitive business. But, in one pre-ERISA case,' the
fiduciaries' decision to withhold payment of the terminated participant's vested benefits until normal retirement age was held an
abuse of discretion, since the decision was motivated solely by the
fiduciaries' fear that the employee would compete with his former
employer.
The interplay of the pre-ERISA state law concerning bad boy
clauses with the policies underlying ERISA may now be examined
in an effort to discern the viability of such forfeiture clauses during
the gap period.
ERISA

COMMON LAw

The district court in Amory fashioned its own "reasonableness
test" for construing bad boy clauses. In light of the public policy
expressed in the legislative history of ERISA, at a minimum the
standard for bad boy clauses should be rigorous: they should be
presumed unreasonable unless the plan administrator carries the
burden of proving otherwise. The Amory court concluded that the
following questions would have to be considered.
[11n light of such reasonableness standard:
1. Were the textual provisions of the contract reasonable in
scope?
2. Were those provisions, if reasonable, properly applied?
3. Was it conscionable to have a decision concerning forfeiture
made by persons in a position to profit at plaintiffs expense, and
if so, what remedies are now open to the respective parties?' 79
However, the court noted that the
important, since, under emerging
ployer has the burden of proving the
ably applied regardless of the plan
thereof. 110

third factor might cease to be
federal common law, the emforfeiture provision was reasoncommittee's good faith or lack

178. Martinez v. Alto Employees' Trust, 273 So.2d 735 (La. Ct. App. 1972). The court
reasoned that deferring payment because of a fear of competitive employment conflicted with
the trustee's duty to administer the trust solely in the interest of the beneficiary-a statutory
obligation in Louisiana, but equally the rule under common law. See Blankenship v. Boyle,
329 F. Supp. 1089 (D.D.C. 1971). Subsequently, the Louisiana courts held that a fiduciary,
in exercising its discretion to make a lump-sum or deferred payment, must examine the
financial picture of the participant and make its decision based upon whether the participant's best interests would be served by an immediate or deferred payment. Deichman v. Alto
Employees' Trust, 332 So.2d 582, 587 (La. Ct. App. 1976). But see Joy Mfg. Co. v. Stohl, 137
Ga. App. 109, 222 S.E.2d 888 (1975) (misapplying Pennsylvania law as to right of employer
to change inchoate retirement benefits).
179. 434 F. Supp. 671, 673 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (footnote omitted).
180. Id. at 673 n.2. One court has described the common plan pattern of employing major
officer-shareholders to administer the plan trust as having "the appearance of a cozy arrange-
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A dissenting opinion by Justice Williams' 8 ' from the recent Michigan Supreme Court decision in Woodward v. Cadillac Overall Supply Co.'1 2 adopts an approach virtually identical to that in Amory,
and provides some insight into the rationales behind it. Justice
Williams carefully reviewed the judicial treatment of noncompetition forfeiture clauses in other jurisdictions and concluded that
Michigan courts should subject those clauses to "strict scrutiny,"
i.e., both the language of the clause and the application of the
restraint should be reasonable.' 3 Moreover, the employer would
have the burden of showing that the restraint is valid under the
traditional reasonableness test. 84' That burden would be carried
only by proof that a noncompetition clause: (1) extends no greater
than is necessary for the protectibn of the legitimate interest of the
employer; (2) does not impose undue hardship on the employee; and
(3) is not injurious to the interest of the public. 85'
Justice Williams justified his "strict scrutiny"-an equivalent to
the presumption of unreasonableness in Amory-on the grounds
that: (1) employer overreaching is invited during the establishment
of most retirement plans because of an imbalance in bargaining
ment." Miller v. Associated Pension Trusts, Inc., 541 F.2d 726, 729 (8th Cir. 1976).
181. 396 Mich. 379, 384, 240 N.W.2d 710, 711 (1976). Justice Williams was joined in his
dissent by Chief Justice Kavanagh.
182. 396 Mich. 379, 240 N.W.2d 710 (1976). The Woodward litigation resulted from the
Cadillac Overall's plan committee's termination of the otherwise 100% vested pension rights
of certain employees. After a class action suit was filed, the defendants argued their action
was justified by the plan's anticompetition bad boy clause. Plaintiffs' motion for summary
judgment, based upon a statute prohibiting covenants not to compete, MICH. COMP. LAWs
ANN. § 445.761 (1965), was denied by the trial court. The Michigan Supreme Court's affirmance of that denial and remand of the case was based solely on a prior narrow judicial
interpretation given the statute, analogous to the employer's choice rationale. The majority
opinion, however, closed with the caveat: "Appellant's other arguments are not properly
presented for our consideration by this motion for summary judgment but depend upon facts
which must be developed at trial." Id. at 384, 240 N.W.2d at 711.
This was a case of first impression in Michigan. Six months earlier, the Sixth Circuit had
"applied" Michigan law, concluding that Michigan courts would not adopt the "employee's
choice" rationale and consequently, would not find an unlimited bad boy clause unreasonable. Bannert v. American Can Co., 525 F.2d 104, 110 (6th Cir. 1975). However, since only a
distinct minority of the states have addressed the issue of bad boy clauses in retirement plans,
and since there are two conflicting lines of authority in the area, it is risky for federal courts
to guess what a state court would hold in a case of first impression. This is another justification for creation of ERISA common law which would govern both during and after the interim
period.
183. 396 Mich. at 402, 240 N.W.2d at 715 (Williams, J., dissenting).
184. Id. at 403, 240 N.W.2d at 715. The dissent pointed out that "[pllacing the burden
on the employer is sensible not only due to the strict scrutinizing given employee restraints,
but also because the employer has a more complete view of the interests of the business than
an employee, and thus is in a better position to show a restraint is no more burdensome than
needed to protect the employer's legitimate interest." Id. at 402 n.17, 240 N.W.2d at 720 n.17.
185. 396 Mich. at 402, 240 N.W.2d at 715.
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power; (2) a forfeiture clause is not necessary since the employer
already obtains consideration from the employee in the form of his
continued services; and (3) noncompetition forfeiture clauses
usually affect a far wider range of people than do covenants not to
compete ancillary to the sale of a business. In this context, it was
noted that ERISA establishes a federal policy regarding noncompetition forfeiture clauses:
The central thrust of the new act is to encourage the creation of
private retirement plans through tax incentives and to protect the
employee's rights under these plans. Under the act, benefits must
vest within certain prescribed time limitations . . .Once the right
to benefits vests, it cannot be forfeited with certain exceptions not
applicable to this case. Specifically, Congress provided that under
the act, a vested right is not to be forfeited because the employee
later went to work for a competitor.'"

It would appear that under Amory a noncompetition forfeiture
clause which is unreasonable in its language, albeit reasonable in
application, will not be enforced. Justice Williams' dissent in
Woodward pointed out: (1) an unreasonably broad noncompetition
forfeiture clause has an in terrorem effect upon employees who comply with the overbroad restraint; (2) many employees whose benefits
are forfeited upon an unreasonable application of such a clause
never reach the courts; (3) "an overbroad clause heightens the illeffect of non-competition forfeiture clauses on the public interest
determining competition and employee mobility even where it
serves no legitimate interest of the employer;"'' 7 and (4) enforce186. Id. at 403, 240 N.W.2d at 716-17 (citations and footnotes omitted). The South Carolina Supreme Court similarly found the ERISA legislative history of great assistance in
reaching its conclusion that a bad boy clause is unenforceable, absent reasonable temporal
and geographic limitations. Almers v. South Carolina National Bank, 217 S.E.2d 135, 139
(S.C. 1975).
187. 396 Mich. at 404, 240 N.W.2d at 719. Justice Williams contrasted a bad boy forfeiture
clause in a retirement plan with a covenant not to compete ancillary to sale of a business:
a non-competition forfeiture clause is not necessary for the employer to get the
major value of what he pays for in entering into an employment contract and
establishing a retirement program, i.e., the continued services of his employees and
the tax benefits granted businesses establishing retirement programs. Refusal to
enforce an overbroad non-competition forfeiture clause does not, therefore, grossly
distort the overall agreement between employer and employees.

Id. at 404, 240 N.W.2d at 720.
In contrast, the employee's choice cases, in upholding bad boy clauses, reasoned that these
forfeiture provisions were supported by reasonable business justifications that clearly outweighed any potential harm to the competing former employee. "It was designed to protect
Graphic Systems and its employees from competition by former employees who attempt at
the same time to share the benefits of profits earned by faithful employees whom the plan
seeks to reward for their services." Keller v. Graphic Systems, Inc., 422 F.Supp. 1005, 1012
(N. D. Ohio 1976); accord, Golden v. Kentile Floors, Inc., 512 F.2d 838, 846 (5th Cir. 1975);
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ment of such a clause encourages employers to continue to use overbroad language to the detriment of the public interest.' 8 These
consequences are important reasons for a court's refusal to enforce
an unreasonably worded forfeiture clause.
Federal common law derived from ERISA and its underlying public policy should govern the validity of bad boy clauses during the
interim period. However, state law, to the extent it accords with and
furthers ERISA objectives, may be incorporated into federal common law. Thus, it must be determined to what degree the state
doctrine of "reasonableness" is consistent with ERISA policy.
.The Amory court, by adopting a reasonableness test similar to
that used by the various states, indicated its belief that this standard is consonant with ERISA. Insofar as application of the test
results in decreased forfeitures of vested benefits, it is indeed consistent with federal policy. Nevertheless, a reasonableness standard
would still allow forfeitures of vested benefits if the bad boy clause
was reasonably worded and applied. A question therefore remains
whether the reasonableness approach truly furthers the ERISA policy against forfeiture of vested benefits. In short, does ERISA policy
require prohibition of all bad boy clauses? If so, does this prohibition
extend to bad boy forfeitures of rights vested in excess of ERISA's
minimum standards?
Case analysis of the legislative policy underlying ERISA supports
a total ban of bad boy forfeitures during the interim period. For
example, in Almers v. South Carolina National Bank of
Charleston,'5 the South Carolina Supreme Court considered a forfeiture clause in a pre-ERISA profit-sharing plan which provided
that a participant would lose his vested benefits upon accepting
employment with a competitor. While ultimately ruling that forfeiture clauses without reasonable temporal and geographic limitations are invalid, the Almers court analyzed Congress' approach in
enacting ERISA. The court observed that Congress had concluded
that forfeitability of pension and profit sharing retirement income
interfered with the mobility of labor to the detriment of the economy. Therefore, under ERISA a vested benefit would no longer be
Miller v. Associated Pension Trusts, 396 F. Supp. 907, 911 (E.D. Mo. 1975), aff'd, 541 F.2d
727 (8th Cir. 1976). ("Such a provision is designed to protect the integrity of the plan, and is
therefore valid since any competitive actions on the part of a former employee would in all
probability have a detrimental effect upon the profit sharing aspect of the plan.").
188. The Woodward dissent concluded that an overbroad forfeiture clause, i.e., without
temporal or geographic restrictions, either unnegotiated or negotiated when the employee was
substantially disadvantaged in bargaining power will always be unreasonable, since an overbroad provision is "contrary to the public interest." 396 Mich. at 403, 240 N.W.2d at 721.
189. 217 S.E.2d 135 (S.C. 1975).
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forfeitable merely because the employee later went to work for a
competitor or was disloyal to the employer. "Congress noted that it
was in the public interest to have a portable working class, unimpeded by forfeiting provisions. Congress has concluded, and we
think properly so, that the spectre of financial prostration upon
retirement due to forfeitable rights effectively deters employees
from accepting competitive employment.' 90 The court noted that
from this premise, it would follow that forfeiture provisions should
always be declared void.
Furthermore, state and federal courts which have analyzed the
ERISA minimum vesting provisions have concluded that bad boy
forfeiture clauses will be void after the effective date of those provisions. 19Thus, there is no logical reason why bad boy clauses should
not be voided as well during the interim period after state law is
preempted. This result would not be contrary to the congressional
purpose behind the delay in the effective date of the nonforfeitability provisions. As noted earlier, the purpose of the delay is to
grant employers adequate time to obtain insurance of their funds to
comply with the vesting standards.'9 2 Voiding anticompetition
clauses should not increase costs for either defined benefit or defined
contribution plans, since it is unlikely that plan actuaries include
amounts due to bad boy forfeitures when calculating plan sponsor
93
contributions. '
It would also be consistent with ERISA policy to void bad boy
forfeitures of benefits vested in excess of the minimum. However,
these forfeitures are allowed under the Treasury's interpretation of
the literal language of the statute. Because it can be expected that
190. Id. at 139 (citations omitted).
191. See Keller v. Graphic Systems, Inc., 422 F. Supp. 1005, 1008 (N.D. Ohio 1976);
Amory v. Boyden Associates, Inc., 434 F. Supp. 671 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); Woodward v. Cadillac
Overall Supply Co., 396 Mich. 379, 240 N.W.2d 710 (1976); Almers v. South Carolina Nat'l
Bank, 217 S.E.2d 135 (S.C. 1975).
192. See text accompanying note 39 supra.
193. The plan actuary generally employs "actuarial assumptions" to discount in advance,
from the employer contributions needed to provide a participant's benefit at normal retirement age, some or all of the following factors: (1) preretirement mortality; (2) investment
experience or "interest"; (3) expense of administration, if not paid by plan sponsor; (4)
turnover of employees, i.e., separation from service prior to full vesting or prior to full accrual
of the maximum benefit under the plan; and (5) projected changes in compensation. Lee,
Joint and Survivor Annuities under ERISA-The Gamble on Survival, 3 J. CORP. TAX. 241,
244 n. 8 (1976). The author understands that actuaries generally do not discount in advance
for divestitures due to violation of bad boy clauses. Hence a ban on bad boy clauses would
not give rise to an "experience loss" which occurs when the fund's actual experience is less
favorable than had been anticipated or "assumed" by the actuary. Potentially, both changes
in actuarial assumptions and experience loss can increase employer costs without resulting
in increased benefit levels.
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smaller plans will commonly provide for greater vested benefits
than ERISA requires," 4 it can also be expected that a great deal of
litigation involving bad boy forfeitures of the excess benefits will
arise. Thus, a desirable legislative resolution would be to clearly
articulate the policy concerning excess benefit forfeitures.
CONCLUSION

With the advent of ERISA, litigation over the enforceability of
bad boy clauses-in recent years the most frequent pension issue in
state courts-will shift to the federal courts. The contradiction of
ERISA legislative history on its face prohibiting bad boy clauses
and Treasury approval of these clauses in restricted though not
infrequent circumstances, in addition to increased awareness by
retirement plan participants of their ERISA rights, 9 5 should spur a
wave of litigation in this area, already foreshadowed by Keller and
Amory. If the courts do not adopt the suggested approach of invalidating all bad boy clauses after January 1, 1975, as contrary to
federal public policy, they are likely to become caught up in the
never ending task of determining whether such a clause and its
application are reasonable. Moreover, in that event, overly broad
bad boy clauses would continue to have their in terrorem effect
while aggrieved participants would be precluded from coming into
court, or from obtaining adequate representation once in court, due
to the small dollar amount of their claims. For these reasons, the
Department of Labor should shut the post-ERISA pandora's box
opened by the Treasury by strongly and promptly articulating the
public policy considerations militating against any enforcement of
bad boy clauses.
194. Many existing smaller plans will, in order to meet the requirements of Rev. Proc.
75-49, 1975-1 C.B. 584, as modified by Rev. Proc. 76-11, 1976-1 C.B.550, either maintain their
existing pre-ERISA vesting schedule, which is usually more rapid than the ERISA minimums, see Credited Service, supra note 44, at 369-70, or grant the greater of the existing
schedule or the four-forty rule to existing participants while using the four-forty rule alone
for future participants. In both instances, limitation of the bad boy clause to members of the
prohibited group will eliminate § 401 (a) (4) discrimination in operation problems. Thus,
vested rights in excess of the ERISA minimum standards will undoubtedly exist in a large
number of plans for a period after the 1976 calendar year. It should be noted that more than
two-thirds of the 473,272 private pensions plans in 1975 had 10 or less participants. However,
90% of all participants were covered by fairly large plans. Department of Labor News Release
76-1403 (Nov. 12, 1976).
195. Department of Labor regulations require that the summary plan description, which
must be given to plan participants, contain a statement of the participants' "ERISA rights."
Lab. Reg. § 2520.102-3 (t), 42 Fed. Reg. 37,182 (July 19, 1977).

